NIACE has a broad remit to promote lifelong learning opportunities for adults. NIACE works to develop increased participation in education and training, particularly for those who do not have easy access because of class, gender, age, race, language and culture, learning difficulties or disabilities, or insufficient financial resources.

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Cataloguing in Publication Data
A CIP record of this title is available from the British Library

Printed and bound in the UK

ISBN: 978 1 86201 411 4
“It is hardly possible to overrate the value, for the improvement of human beings, of things which bring them into contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of thought and action unlike those with which they are familiar... there is no nation which does not need to borrow from others.”


“More than anything else, I wanted to become British because Britain has allowed me to flourish. It has been kind to me: in work, writing and love. And I like the British. I like the distance of their humour, their cringingly painful politeness, the innate sense of fairness, and the room for never-ending debate that allows me to be publicly critical of Britain in the first place.”


Since the development of a framework for lifelong learning calls for long-term thinking, this paper tries to look beyond the immediate future. However, this paper has been produced when Britain is entering a recession, which changes public attitudes to migration and puts social cohesion under stress. Where, in the early 21st century, the consensus that migration was good for the economy was relatively widespread (though far from universal), the onset of recession makes migration much more politically sensitive.

This paper presents an account of the historical background and a view of the implications of likely future patterns of migration for lifelong learning. There will no doubt be fluctuations in the inward and outward flow of migrants over time, but the underlying pattern seems unlikely to change fundamentally: movement within the EU will continue relatively freely, while immigration from outside will continue but be limited as a proportion of the whole. Well managed, migration will be good for Britain and its citizens, new and old.

Lifelong learning will not solve all problems, but it can help make the processes more positive for all.
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Foreword

This is the third Thematic Paper to be published from the Inquiry into the Future for Lifelong Learning (IFLL). The Inquiry was established in September 2007 and will produce its main report in mid-2009. It is sponsored by the National Institute of Adult and Continuing Education (NIACE), with an independent Board of Commissioners under the chairmanship of Sir David Watson. Full details of the IFLL can be found at www.niace.org.uk/lifelonglearninginquiry. The overall goal of the Inquiry is to offer an authoritative and coherent strategic framework for lifelong learning in the UK. This will involve:

- articulating a broad rationale for public and private investment in lifelong learning;
- a re-appraisal of the social and cultural value attached to it by policy-makers and the public;
- developing new perspectives on policy and practice.

IFLL: principal strands

The Thematic Papers are complemented by several other strands of IFLL work:

- **Expenditure Papers.** These will provide a broad overall picture of expenditure on all forms of lifelong learning: by government, across all departments; by employers, public and private; by the third sector; and by individuals and households. We shall provide, as a complement, a summary of overall participation. The two in combination should provide a benchmark for mapping future trends.

- **Sector Papers.** These will discuss the implications of lifelong learning for each of the sectors involved in providing learning opportunities: pre-school, school, FE, HE, adult education centres, private trainers, third sector organisations and local authorities. The goal here is to encourage innovative thinking on how these parts do or do not fit together, as part of a systemic approach to lifelong learning.

- **Public Value Papers.** These will look, from different angles and using a variety of techniques, at the ‘social productivity’ of lifelong learning; i.e. what effects it has on areas such as health, civic activity or crime. The goal is both to provide evidence on these effects and to stimulate a broader debate on how such effects can be measured and analysed.

- **Learning Infrastructures.** Unlike the others, this strand consists not of a series of papers but of a set of scenarios, designed to promote debate and imagination on what the infrastructure for learning might look like in the future. This challenges us to integrate the physical environments of learning, the virtual environments of learning technologies, and people’s competences and behaviour.

We have also been consulting in the four UK nations, and amongst learner groups and other stakeholders. Periodic updates on IFLL progress are to be found in our Bulletin (you can register for Inquiry Bulletins at: www.niace.org.uk/lifelonglearninginquiry).
Thematic Papers

The Thematic Papers form the core initial substance of the Inquiry’s work. They cover the following:

- Prosperity, Employment and Work
- Demography and Social Structure
- Well-being and Happiness
- Migration and Communities
- Technological Change
- Poverty and Social Exclusion
- Citizenship and Belonging
- Crime and Social Exclusion
- Sustainable Development

Each of these themes has been tackled in the same way: a call for evidence was issued; a day-long seminar was organised, with inputs from practitioners, policy-makers and researchers; and the results of these two stages, and subsequent discussions and contributions, are distilled into a Thematic Paper, written either by an Inquiry Commissioner or a member of the Inquiry Secretariat.

We have posted on the Inquiry website the evidence submitted specifically to the Inquiry, along with the papers and presentations contributed to the thematic seminar. A list of those who submitted evidence on Migration and Communities is at the end of this paper.

Next steps

This Thematic Paper represents the culmination of one stage in the Inquiry’s work on this strand. We are very grateful to all those who responded to the call for evidence, and who contributed subsequently to the seminar. However, we are very well aware that the process of debate and consultation has been limited. Some people will not have been aware of the call for evidence, or not had time to make a submission. Others will have waited until there were some conclusions to respond to. Therefore, the publication of this Thematic Paper is also an invitation for a second round of comment, submission and debate. Are there important issues which are not covered here? What further evidence should be included? And, most importantly, what further conclusions should be drawn, to feed into the Inquiry’s final recommendations? Please send your comments to lifelonglearninginquiry@niace.org.uk

Responses to these questions will be taken into account as we move towards preparing the Inquiry’s main report. This is due to be published in September 2009. It will be followed by a further period of discussion – and revision.

Professor Tom Schuller
Director, IFLL

Sir David Watson
Chair, IFLL Commissioners
Executive summary

The challenge of changing communities

Over time, all communities experience change, although the speed and impact varies from place to place. In recent years, the pace of change in Britain has increased, and has affected areas which have historically been more stable. The impact of these changes, together with global political disturbances, has led to growing concern about the coherence and stability of communities in Britain.

This paper is about the implications of such change within communities for lifelong learning, and especially the implications of migration, both within the country and from outside it.

The last decade has seen a substantial increase in the movement of people within and between countries, globally and within Europe. Well managed, this migration can make a major contribution to the economies of the host country and the people’s countries of origin, to the creativity and diversity of the areas into which people migrate, and to the quality of life of migrants and their families.

However, there are also problems. Migrants have to learn the language, values and expectations of the host community, and may encounter barriers (intended and accidental) to integration, as well as direct prejudice. At the same time, the settled community can feel threatened by incomers with unfamiliar expectations and attitudes.

Lifelong learning can help migrants to integrate into new communities¹, and help those communities to welcome and adapt to new members, whether they have come 50 or 5,000 miles. The critical question is how to maximise the benefits and minimise the difficulties of change within communities. This calls for a more coordinated policy at national level, a clearer and more active role for Local Government, the development of some neglected areas of the curriculum, and some changes in funding.

Diversity

Within neighbourhoods, people differ in many ways: by country of origin, language, religion, gender, age, sexual orientation, qualifications, employment status and migration status, as well as by attachment to a range of interest and cultural groups. Even where there are large groups of people from a particular country or religion, it does not follow that they all agree, and tensions within national groups can be as severe as tensions with people from other nations.

¹ We are mainly concerned with ‘communities’ in the sense of the geographical area where people live (however people may define its boundaries).
The nature of diversity in British communities is changing in two particular ways:

- **increasing polarisation**: neighbourhoods generally have become more polarised in terms of age mix, wealth, social engagement and political activity (though less polarised in terms of ethnic and racial origin);
- **the rise of ‘super-diversity’**: neighbourhoods increasingly include people from a wide range of different backgrounds rather than, as in the past, a host community with a small number of identifiable minority groups².

**Migration**

Migration can bring a range of benefits to society. Migrants fill gaps in the labour market and help counteract the damaging effects of an ageing population; they stimulate creativity and dynamism in economic and cultural life, and make a major contribution to global economic development through remittances to their home countries. Without migration, the economy would face major labour and skill shortages in many key areas; public concerns that migrants take jobs from existing residents and overload welfare services are generally unfounded³. However, where migration coincides with poverty and social exclusion in a community, it can exacerbate underlying tensions⁴.

Migrants come from many backgrounds, with very different aspirations and expectations. Most are strongly motivated to work and to be accepted as members of British society, but a range of structural barriers can prevent them achieving this. At the same time, people’s sense of identity is strongly rooted in their sense of a coherent local community, which they may feel is threatened by new arrivals.

**Cohesion**

Community cohesion is about how far people feel part of a community. Cohesion strengthens social and political stability and the personal well-being of community members. However, cohesion does not mean static communities: cohesive and resilient communities constantly adapt and flex in response to new ideas, values and expectations as their membership grows and changes.

The overall picture is positive. Most people in Britain report that they get on well with diverse people in their community⁵. The Commission on Integration and Cohesion found that where problems of cohesion arise, they generally result from high levels of migration into neighbourhoods which are already severely disadvantaged.

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² Vertovec (2006).
³ Lemos (2008).
⁴ Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007).
⁵ The fact that the highest percentages of people reporting that they get on well with others in their community are in Northern Ireland may suggest that some people, at least, interpret ‘community’ and ‘difference’ in rather particular ways.
The Commission proposed that a ‘cohesive community’ would be one where all individuals have:

- a clear sense of the contribution they make to a shared vision of the future of the community;
- a clear understanding of their rights and responsibilities;
- broadly similar access to life opportunities, general services and health services;
- trust that local institutions will treat everyone fairly;
- respect for the different contributions of all members, with a focus on common interests;
- strong relationships with different people at work and in the community.

Lifelong learning can help foster cohesion by giving people confidence and a sense of control over their lives, by enabling them to build skills and knowledge to contribute to the community (through paid and unpaid work), and by creating places where people can meet and pursue interests together and thus build relationships and trust.

The likely future

The underlying drivers suggest that communities will change less rapidly in the next decade than in the last. However, economic recession could have a substantial and unpredictable impact.

The most likely future scenario for next decade in Britain is that:

- **labour market demand for migrants (skilled and unskilled) will continue**, despite recession, because of the ageing of the population, with large numbers of people retiring in the next decade. However, the number of migrants wishing to come may decline;
- **there will be no major new wave of immigration** from outside Britain, and flows of refugees will stabilise;  
- **the pattern of emigration from Britain will change**, with fewer British-born people leaving, but there will be a rise in emigration by recent migrants as the relative advantage of working in Britain declines;
- **internal population movement will slow** as a result of financial pressures and constraints on the housing market;
- **ethnic divides will become increasingly blurred**, with a rapid growth in the proportion of people of ‘mixed’ ethnicity and a wider dispersal of migrants across the country;

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6 No further accession to the EU is expected until Turkey. Negotiations on this are not expected to be concluded for at least ten years (and may never be completed).
• religion will become more important in people’s sense of identity, although not necessarily as a source of conflict;
• communities will continue to become more diverse as minority groups disperse out of metropolitan areas and ‘super-diversity’ grows.

Learning and cohesion: issues for Government

National Government sets the framework in which migration is managed, including services to ensure that newcomers are welcomed and rapidly helped to become effective contributing citizens. The key challenges for Government are:

• Securing mainstream lifelong learning services to support cohesion. The biggest challenge for Government is to ensure that diversity continues to be a strength – economically and socially – and that it does not lead to conflict or unfair discrimination, which damages personal well-being, raises social tension and wastes much-needed talent and commitment. It is particularly important to create a long-term, stable set of services which can address underlying issues, and to resist the temptation to adopt short-term measures in response to economic recession or fears of terrorism.

• Coordination of learning policy. Migration is a difficult issue for Government: it is politically contentious, and public opinion is often ill informed. Sometimes, rational solutions to problems are politically unachievable because of public attitudes, low trust in Government, and misinformation. Further, a plethora of Government departments and agencies are involved, with sometimes conflicting policy objectives and strategies. The aim should be to minimise conflicts in line with the four principles outlined below.

• Empowering Local Government to lead. National Government sets a framework or law and regulation, but cohesion happens at local level, where Local Government has a central role to play. However, Local Government has been marginalised in lifelong learning policy and provision in recent years. Local Government needs to be restored to a more central role, so that learning programmes of all kinds can be seen as part of strategies to address social cohesion and well-being, rather than simply as leisure services or skills training.

• Balancing universal and targeted services. One challenge for Government, both local and national, is to devise strategies which strengthen all communities and all their members, while enabling the most disadvantaged to catch up. Policies that focus too strongly on the most disadvantaged and on newcomers can be divisive and create stigmatised services, but policies that ignore differences in human, social and identity capital will merely strengthen exclusion.
Four principles for learning policy

If lifelong learning (in all its forms: public, private and voluntary) is to contribute to increasing social cohesion, it should be informed by a set of four principles:

- **Learning at the right time.** People should have access to learning at the time which suits them best. For most people, this is at the earliest possible point, when their motivation to learn and integrate is highest, and before they learn to survive without integrating. Access to learning is a particular issue for the most vulnerable asylum seekers, who are currently barred from learning on arrival. For some migrants, other pressing needs may make it necessary to delay learning until later.

- **Learning for integration.** Funding of initiatives and programmes should, wherever possible, be directed at activities which bring people together across divides, although there will be times when separate groups are necessary as an interim step, while confidence and skills are built up. Integration does not mean trying to abolish difference, but it does imply reversing a historic trend towards separate development.

- **Learning for contribution.** Learning activities should help migrants to contribute to the community through paid and unpaid activity; it should help them acquire the skills and opportunities to do so. This principle implies an approach which includes, but is broader than, specific language and vocational education, and includes cultural events, festivals and celebrations.

- **Learning for the future.** Learning activities, and especially civic education, should focus on building a shared future rather than on past divisions. This does not mean that people should never discuss the past, or that activities should not celebrate the diversity of heritage (within and beyond the UK). It is sometimes important for the host community to understand why migrants arrive, but learning focused on disputed pasts can be a cause of unhelpful conflict.

Implications for lifelong learning

Lifelong learning is not a panacea for all the ills of society, and educators need appropriate humility in proposing solutions. However, learning can help new arrivals to find a place and role in their new communities, and help the host community to respond hospitably and creatively to new arrivals. Lifelong learning can help by:

- providing everyone with accessible neutral territory where they can meet, interact, build trust and relationships with people of different backgrounds, and overcome some of the myths about ‘outsiders’. Among public services, lifelong learning is uniquely placed since it works with people in groups rather than treating them as individual clients. Such broad universal services have been eroded in recent years by the prioritising of learning for work;
• ensuring that new arrivals, whether they come from another part of the UK or another continent, have the opportunity to acquire the skills (including language) and cultural knowledge (including for citizenship) needed to play a productive part in British society, as soon as possible after their arrival;
• ensuring that everyone in deprived communities (not only migrants) develops the skills to overcome their disadvantages, through learning that provides access to good work opportunities, and through developing the social capital to build links and a sense of shared purpose. This implies targeted recruitment and imaginative ways of engaging learners;
• providing a reinvigorated range of civic education to give people an informed understanding of issues which affect their lives and communities, and the skills to influence decisions. This area of lifelong learning has been neglected in the recent past.

Proposals for action

A variety of strategies can assist people joining new communities:
• **providing a ‘welcome’ entitlement** to a learning programme (of any kind) for all people newly arrived in a community (from within Britain as well as from outside), to help them build new contacts and make learning part of a new identity in a new place;
• **offering a wide range of open opportunities** for people to explore and pursue new interests with others (a core role of traditional adult education which has been cut back in recent years);
• **improving availability of ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) tuition**, developing outreach strategies to reach those who are physically or culturally isolated, and developing tailored ESOL programmes to help people acquire the specialised language required for particular occupations at a variety of levels. At present, some people are barred from tuition by their asylum-seeker status, and others are excluded by a shortage of teachers and funding;
• **providing accessible, well informed and relevant career advice and guidance**, to enable individuals to identify and pursue learning needs and aspirations, and address the associated support needs, including access to work experience and mentoring. The new Adult Advancement and Careers Service has a key role to play here;
• **provide systems for the recognition of foreign qualifications**, and updating and/or conversion opportunities for those with established skills in their countries of origin. There is a need to build a coherent national service based on the experience of many local and short-term projects over 20 years, using the emerging national Qualifications and Credit Framework.
1 Introduction

1.1 Migration, diversity and cohesion

This paper is about the implications for lifelong learning of the changing nature of communities in Britain, and especially of the impact of migration (internal and external to Britain) on this. Three concepts are critical to this discussion:

- **Migration** is about people moving between areas to live (rather than for an occasional visit). ‘Internal migrants’ are people moving within Britain, and ‘external migrants’ people moving here from Europe and beyond. Migration comes in many forms, and migrants arrive with different hopes and needs, and encounter different kinds of reception.

- **Diversity** is about the ways in which people are different. Diversity has many dimensions, including ethnic, linguistic, national, religious, wealth and class differences. The significance of particular kinds of difference varies greatly by area and context.

- **Social cohesion** is about the degree to which people feel themselves to be full members of a community. Men and women often have different experiences of social cohesion. While diversity can make communities more dynamic and vibrant, it also makes cohesion more difficult to achieve and presents people with challenges to tolerate, celebrate and learn from difference.

This paper aims to present as accurate a picture as possible of patterns of migration and community cohesion in Britain. However, this aim is limited by problems of data collection (see Annex 2: Data on migration for more information) and because of the rapidly changing global and national economic context. For our purposes, the precise figures are not as important as the broad trends and what they imply for what individuals and communities need to learn.

1.2 Our changing population

Between 1971 and 2006, the population of Britain grew from 55 to 60 million, with growth in all countries except Scotland. This growth is expected to continue, and the population to reach 71 million by 2031. Half of this increase will be the result of natural growth of the existing population, and half through immigration. While substantial

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7 For simplicity, the term ‘Britain’ is used in this paper in the commonly accepted sense, to include the four countries of the UK.
8 The issues identified here are discussed at greater length in the Inquiry Thematic Paper, Demography and Lifelong Learning (McNair, 2009).
9 Scottish population has been stable since 1990, because Scottish fertility rates and life expectancy are both lower than in the rest of the UK.
10 Mainly as a result of rising life expectancy, plus the higher fertility rates among some ethnic groups.
numbers will continue to emigrate from Britain, their numbers will be outweighed by a continuing flow of immigrants\textsuperscript{11}.

Three million foreign nationals live in Britain: 40 per cent of them born in Europe, 25 per cent in South Asia, and 17 per cent in Africa. People born abroad\textsuperscript{12} constitute 25 per cent of the population of London, and between 4 per cent and 7 per cent of the population of all other regions.

The ethnic and religious mix of Britain as a whole is changing, with a growing proportion of young people coming from one of the minority groups, and those groups dispersing more widely around the country. Britain is also becoming more diverse in religious terms. Religion was always one of the ways in which migrant groups retained a sense of identity and heritage, and religion may be becoming more important to people’s sense of identity. The 2001 census showed varying patterns of concentration of religious affiliation. The strongest link between religion and origin was in the Pakistani and Bangladeshi community, with 95 per cent declaring themselves Muslim. More than two-thirds of all people in the white, black Caribbean and black African groups identified themselves as Christian. Indians were divided, with the largest groups being Hindu and Sikh, followed by Muslims. Two-thirds of Chinese people identified no religion. In the largest growing ethnic group – people of mixed origin – half declared themselves Christian, and a third declared no religion.

The UK is also becoming more linguistically and culturally diverse. At least 300 first languages other than English are spoken by children in British schools, and 16 languages are spoken in more than a third of local authority areas.

In much of Britain, diversity is long established, with many communities including people from one or two other countries. More recently, however, we have seen the rise of ‘super-diversity’, where people from many different backgrounds, with multiple countries of origin, expectations and aspirations, live together. Some groups have strong links to a home country or to a global diaspora centred outside Britain. In some cases, social, religious and political conflicts in home countries continue in tensions between migrants who might appear to come from the same group.

Despite this growing diversity, survey data suggests that social cohesion is generally good in Britain. The proportion of people in England who agree that their local area is ‘a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together’ is stable at around 80 per cent\textsuperscript{13}; the proportion is highest among people over 75 (92 per cent), and lowest among people aged 25–34 (79 per cent). There are only a very few areas where the proportion who agree that people get on well together falls below 50 per

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{11} ONS (2008).}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{12} There are a further 2.3 million British people born abroad: people born in former British colonies; children of service families, with British citizenship by virtue of birth; or naturalised citizens.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{13} Department of Communities and Local Government (2009).}
The proportion of people who feel they ‘belong strongly’ to their neighbourhood has risen over five years from 70 to 76 per cent, but the proportion who feel they belong strongly to Britain has declined from 85 to 83 per cent.

In 2007, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion confirmed the positive picture, but identified particular communities where cohesion is at risk, and argued that more positive action is needed to ensure that the situation does not deteriorate\(^\text{14}\).

### 1.3 Headline messages

Neighbourhoods in Britain are becoming more diverse. In terms of age mix, wealth, social engagement and political activity, they are becoming more polarised, and some communities are becoming ‘super-diverse’, with a vast range of languages, nationalities and histories in a small area. However, communities are becoming less polarised in race and ethnicity, as minority groups disperse across the country.

Well managed, this diversity is a strength: building resilient, creative and interesting communities, but cohesion needs managing. Lifelong learning can help to achieve this, as part of a suite of long-term policy responses.

Local authorities have a central role to play in securing cohesion in their areas.

An effective learning strategy for diversity and cohesion should be built on four principles:

- delivering opportunities at the right time (which often means quickly);
- promoting integration, by bringing diverse people together, rather than promoting separate provision;
- helping everyone to contribute;
- focusing on building shared futures.

Lifelong learning can help by providing:

- a neutral territory where people can meet people unlike themselves around shared interests;
- programmes which welcome new arrivals, whether they have come 50 miles or 5,000;
- opportunities for all in disadvantaged communities, not just new arrivals, to overcome hostility to preconceptions about unfair treatment;
- a revived programme of civic education to engage people actively in the life of their communities.

\(^\text{14}\) Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007).
Key elements of such a strategy would include:

- a ‘welcome entitlement’ or free education to all newcomers to an area;
- a wide range of opportunities to learn, to attract an equally wide range of people;
- better and more accessible (and more rapidly accessible) provision of tuition of English as a second language;
- good advice on career and life choices, as part of the new Adult Advancement and Careers Service;
- improved mechanisms for the recognition of overseas qualifications and experience, building on the new national Qualifications and Credit Framework, to enable newcomers to make full use of their skills and experience.
2. Migration

Diversity is not new. It has been a feature of British society for centuries. However, in recent years, we have seen more migration from within Europe, and the scale and spread of migration has brought diversity to more communities, and more complex patterns of diversity to others.

2.1 The many kinds of migration and migrants

Everyone who moves home has to learn to fit into a new community, whether the move is a few miles or across continents and cultures. Some learning needs are similar for everyone, and the educational response may also be similar. The greater the geographical and cultural difference between migrants, however, the greater the challenge. The challenges are particularly acute for those who have moved due to reasons beyond their control (like refugees fleeing political instability or violence).

It is not easy to divide migrants into simple categories. For example, most internal migrants and international migrants from the English-speaking world share a language, but may not share cultural values and expectations. On the other hand, migrants from most EU countries share some common cultural values and expectations, but may not share all of them, and do not necessarily share the language. Migrants from non-English-speaking countries outside the EU may lack both linguistic and cultural common ground. Some areas have a long history of immigration and diversity, while for other areas these are new; the recent trend towards the dispersal of people from minority ethnic groups, and EU migrants, out of cities brings black faces and non-English speakers into smaller towns and rural areas for the first time.

The learning challenges presented by migration are therefore better analysed in terms of the skills, knowledge and services that people require, rather than simplistic divisions based on whether people are internal or external migrants, or their country of origin.

2.2 The impact of migration

The benefits of migration

Migration benefits Britain in a variety of ways:\n
- **dynamic benefits of diversity.** The diversity of experience, ideas and cultures which migration brings contributes to a vibrant cultural life, and to innovation and competition in the economy. A diverse environment attracts talent, and many people welcome greater diversity in the arts, cooking and social life;

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• **efficient use of labour.** Immigration brings extra people to fill skills gaps and shortages, especially in areas and jobs where local people are not available or not willing to work for the pay available. This is particularly true at the top and bottom of the labour market – in high-skilled jobs such as for accountants, doctors and dentists\(^ {16}\), and unskilled ones in agriculture, packing, construction and catering;

• **energising the labour market.** Because migrants are a self-selected group who tend to be young, ambitious and hard working, they tend to raise average productivity per head. Since EU expansion in 2004, GDP per head has grown faster in Britain (which opened its borders immediately) than in any other G7 country\(^ {17}\);

• **a ‘safety valve’ for the labour market.** Most migrants are less tied to location – more able and willing to move to where there is work – than the native population, and some groups are willing to return home when the labour market contracts\(^ {18}\). Half the Eastern Europeans who entered after 2004 have already returned\(^ {19}\), and inflow fell in 2008 in response to the changing relative economic performance of Britain and Eastern Europe;

• **fiscal benefits.** Immigrants work and pay taxes, and are less likely than the settled population to be in receipt of benefits\(^ {20}\). Total tax revenue from immigrants from outside Britain rose by a third between 1999–2000 and 2003–2004, to £41.2 billion\(^ {21}\). It is certainly higher now, since total immigrant numbers have risen substantially, and the latest migrants are disproportionately likely to be in work. The exception to this is, of course, asylum seekers, who are not allowed to work until their asylum claims are resolved\(^ {22}\);

• **trade, cultural and political linkage.** International networks promote exports and cultural exchange, and people living globally mobile lives also have a particular stake in international economic and political stability;

• **economic development.** Migration makes a significant contribution to global economic development. The total sum of remittances from migrants to their home countries, estimated as £3.5 billion per annum, is larger than Britain’s total aid budget, and a major element of the economies of some countries\(^ {23}\);

• **improved dependency ratio.** Since migrants are, overwhelmingly, young adults, and most are healthy and single, they help offset the effects of an ageing population\(^ {24}\).

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\(^ {16}\) The number of doctors from A8 countries registering to work in the NHS has increased by 25 per cent in the last two years.

\(^ {17}\) Sriskandarajah et al. (2005).

\(^ {18}\) This ‘safety valve’ effect has traditionally been fulfilled in the UK by Irish migrants, whose flows have followed the relative strengths of the Irish and UK labour markets.

\(^ {19}\) Pollard et al. (2008).

\(^ {20}\) The number of A8 migrants claiming any form of welfare benefit is less than 2.5 per cent (IPPR, quoted on BBC website).

\(^ {21}\) Sriskandarajah et al. (2005) found that although immigrants made up 9.6 per cent of the population, they contributed 10 per cent of Government revenue.

\(^ {22}\) However, asylum seekers constitute a very small proportion (around 4 per cent) of all migrants.

\(^ {23}\) Vertovec (2006).

\(^ {24}\) This is true even if migrants decide to stay permanently, because most will have decades in the labour market before they reach retirement.
The challenges of migration

Migration has its costs, however, and there are significant public anxieties about uncontrolled migration. Whether or not there is evidence to support these fears, policymakers need to be aware of them and reflect them in how they develop and present policy. Fears include:

- **Displacing native workers.** There is a fear, particularly during a recession, that immigrants take jobs which would otherwise be taken by local people; in particular places and circumstances, there can be competition and conflict. However, there is no evidence that, over an economic cycle, this is true (in Britain or elsewhere), because the number of jobs is not fixed, and immigrants rarely compete directly with local people. There is a consensus among economists that dynamic economic models show strongly positive effects from migration over the long term. Research by the IPPR suggests that the employment rates of UK-born people are consistently higher than for those born overseas, and that the advantage is equivalent to two years of additional education.

- **Depressing wage levels.** Any expansion in the size of the workforce might be expected to have some impact on wage levels, assuming that the supply of skills was comparable. Research by the IPPR suggests that the effect on wage levels from immigration, even on the large scale experienced since 2004, is negligible. The IPPR found that the overall impact of the influx of A8 migrants in 2004 was to slightly raise average wage levels, but depress them very slightly at the lower end of the earning scale. The IPPR concludes that a 1 per cent increase in the share of migrants in the population reduces average wage levels by 0.3 per cent.

- **Pressure on welfare services.** There is a fear that immigrants make disproportionate demands on welfare services. However, most immigrants are younger and healthier than the British population as a whole (82 per cent of A8 migrants are aged 18–34). Immigrants are much less likely than the native population to make calls on welfare budgets (and most are ineligible for most welfare benefits until they have been in Britain some time). The numbers claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance or occupying subsidised housing are extremely small.

- **Overcrowding.** There is a concern that Britain, or parts of it, may be or may become overcrowded, and there is evidence that people’s sense of ‘neighbourliness’ declines with rising population density. However, it is not clear that there is an ‘ideal’ population density (The Netherlands has a greater population density than Britain, and Paris is denser than London), although it is clearly

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26 The Institute for Public Policy Research.
27 Reed and Latorre (2009).
28 The eight countries which acceded to the EU in 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.
31 Bowling et al. (2003).
possible for local services to become overloaded when resource allocation to Local Government does not keep pace with changing migration patterns.

- **Culture change.** There is a concern that traditional values and behaviours are threatened by immigration, and it is certainly true that immigration leads to change. This is not a new phenomenon, and values which are thought of as traditional often have roots in previous generations of migrants.

- **Community tensions.** High levels of migration are often associated with community tension. The Commission on Integration and Cohesion found that tension usually only exists where high levels of migration combine with other forms of social exclusion like poverty, poor housing and unemployment. However, where such underlying problems exist, a relatively small incident can easily focus tensions on groups perceived to be outsiders;

- **Reducing investment in training.** It has been suggested that migration harms the native skills base by discouraging employers from investing in training their existing workforces, since they can recruit relatively skilled migrant labour instead. However, there is little evidence that employers would invest in training if there was no migrant labour available, outside a small number of highly skilled occupations. More typically, faced with skills shortages, employers reduce output, quality or product range rather than raise skills;

- **Depriving developing countries of skilled labour.** Substantial numbers of highly skilled people migrate to Britain from developing countries, and there can be no doubt that this represents a drain on the social fabric of those countries. This is a particular problem in professions with high international mobility, like medicine, since training medical professionals is a high cost for developing countries, from which they may derive little return (other than financial remittances).

- **Creation of a permanent underclass.** It has sometimes been suggested that high levels of immigration create a permanent underclass; however, there is relatively little evidence of this as a long-term phenomenon. For those migrants who come temporarily, and whose point of comparison is the economy of their country of origin, low pay (by UK standards) may be very attractive. Some start in jobs below their qualifications but move up as their language skills and cultural knowledge develop, although many remain trapped in relatively low-skilled work by limited language skills or by a lack of opportunities with their current employers or in their current locations. Second generations typically move up the economic and social scale more rapidly than the native population of the areas in which they live.

- **Protection of vulnerable people.** The UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, to which Britain is a signatory, exists to ensure protection for those subject to persecution in their countries of origin. Those who enter seeking protection from the convention have a special status as asylum seekers, but are particularly

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32 Keep (2000).
vulnerable. Balancing the protection of asylum seekers’ rights against public concern about illegal migration is a delicate task for Government. Even more vulnerable are those who enter as trafficked women and are brought in, against the law, as domestic servants or to work in illegal work.

2.3 Migration within Britain

Most internal migration within Britain is very local\textsuperscript{33}. Those moving longer distances tend to be young adults (typically moving north for higher education and then south to establish careers), and older people migrating at or around retirement.

Historically, internal migrants have generally flowed from the North to the South, although there have been periods when the flow reverses, as Figure 1 shows.

Figure 1: Annual net population flow to the South, 1976–2006

The largest regional net inflow in recent years has been to the South West (28,000 in 2006), while the largest outflows have been from London, Leicester and Birmingham. Some local authorities experience relatively rapid change: in one year (2005–2006) the population of five authorities grew by over 1.3 per cent, while 17 local authorities shrank by more than 1 per cent. Six London boroughs lost more than 2 per cent of their populations, and Newham lost 4 per cent.

Growth or shrinkage of population presents problems for communities, but the situation is especially difficult in areas with high levels of movement both in and

\textsuperscript{33} In any one year, 11 per cent of people move house within the UK, but 60 per cent of these moves are under 10 kilometres.

\textsuperscript{34} Office for National Statistics.
out, like some London boroughs and other metropolitan areas. This churn is also a particular feature of the broad South East region, with very high levels of movement between London and the Home Counties.35

One more recent development has been a wider dispersal of minority and migrant groups to areas which have little previous experience of diversity. The most striking movement is the flow of Eastern European migrants into agriculture and food processing in Lincolnshire and the Fens, but dispersal is also happening among black and other minority ethnic groups relocating out of metropolitan areas.

2.4 International migration

The global context

As long as Britain continues to be an attractive destination, worldwide population growth and political instability will affect migration both in and out. It is important, therefore, to understand the scale and nature of global changes.

The total global population is still growing, but the overall rate of growth has been declining since the 1970s. At the end of the twentieth century, Europe became the first continent where total population began to shrink, despite rising life expectancy, as a result of declining fertility rates. Within the developed world (OECD36 countries), permanent legal migration, mainly for family reunion, is rising at about 5 per cent per year, while the number of asylum claims is falling. Over the last 40 years, the number of people living outside their home countries has more than doubled.

The impact of migration in most OECD countries is to slow the processes of population decline and population ageing, since most migrants are young adults of childbearing age, and, in almost all OECD countries, inward migration is larger than natural population decline37, 38. Migration contributes to lowering the economic dependency ratio, which would otherwise rise as the number of retired people increases39.

Some countries, including Britain, have attempted to manage immigration by restricting entry to people with high-level skills that are believed to be in short supply. However, many migrants (whatever their previous qualifications) are, in practice, employed in low-skilled jobs, and in many OECD countries the major areas of labour shortage are in relatively low-skilled work – in construction trades, hospitality, household work, cleaning and personal care.

A substantial proportion of long-term migrants return to their countries of origin within five years; this is particularly common when people approach retirement age. Although

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35 Two-thirds of moves out of London are to the South East or Eastern regions, and 40 per cent of moves out of the South East are into London.
36 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
37 The exceptions are Japan, Germany and Hungary, which are all experiencing shrinking populations.
38 The issue of an ageing population is explored in more detail in the IFLL Thematic Paper, Demography and Lifelong Learning (McNaik, 2009).
39 These issues are explored at greater length in the Inquiry paper on Demography and Lifelong Learning (ibid.).
some countries have attempted campaigns to encourage migrants to return to their countries of origin, these have had only limited impact. However, whether migrants return is probably influenced by economic conditions in the two countries. Recession in Britain is likely to lead to a significant outflow (permanent or temporary) of migrants, back to their countries of origin.

The balance of immigration and emigration

Figure 2 shows the balance of inward and outward migration since 1998. Numbers are not precise, because people entering from the European Economic Area have relatively free entry and exit and are not always recorded. Although global estimates suggest that the scale of illegal immigration is rising, this is principally as a result of people who entered legitimately on a temporary basis overstaying.

Figure 2: Total international migration to and from the UK, 1997–2006

As Figure 2 shows, overall international migration has been gradually rising since 1998, with a peak in 2004 following EU enlargement. In 2007, immigration flattened out and emigration dropped sharply, both probably influenced by the downturn in the British economy and problems in the housing market; it is possible that this will result in a net outflow of people in the short term.

People migrating from Britain are overwhelmingly British and tend to be older than immigrants. Many only intend to leave for a limited period, but ONS data shows that, while the number planning to stay abroad for less than four years has remained

40 This pattern is shared with Australia, China, Germany, India and the Philippines.
constant over a decade, at around 100,000, the number planning to stay for more than four years, which rose rapidly to over 250,000 per annum in 2006, dropped steeply in 2007. The combined effect of immigration and emigration is to lower the average age of the population.

Why do people come to Britain?

In recent years, Britain has been seen as a relatively attractive destination for migrants, with a high demand for labour and a strong economy, and a language which is widely spoken and highly valuable for internationally mobile people.

Although motives for migration can be complex and mixed, there are four broad categories of migrants, which tend to be seen differently by the general public and by employers, and treated differently by the law:

- **economic migrants** – people moving out of choice to seek better opportunities, with a definite job offer or seeking work (which may be long or short term). Most are highly skilled or from the EU;
- **family reunion** – families moving to join a breadwinner already established in Britain;
- **international students** – people entering to study in UK institutions, mainly in higher education;
- **asylum seekers** – people seeking refuge from persecution in another country.

Economic migrants vary in their intentions. Some are seeking to improve their lives and circumstances by settling permanently in Britain; others plan to stay for a period to earn money and return home; and a third group – ‘lifestyle migrants’ – are simply seeking a new challenge or adventure, without necessarily having a long-term plan. Despite much adverse publicity, asylum seekers now represent less than 5 per cent of immigrants into Britain, and the number of asylum claims has been falling – from a peak of 84,000 in 2002, to 23,400 in 2007. Although Britain has a high absolute number of asylum applications, as a proportion of population, the rate is low compared with that in other EU countries. Including successful appeals, 28 per cent of asylum seekers were granted asylum or humanitarian protection or discretionary leave to remain. Asylum seekers are not permitted to work or study while their claims are considered, unless that process takes over six months.

Asylum seekers present particular and urgent political and educational challenges to the host community. Many asylum seekers have not chosen Britain as a destination. They may have experienced physical and psychological trauma, which can affect their

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41 Irish evidence suggests that half of all Irish emigrants fall into this category, and it is probably the case for a high proportion of Australian and New Zealand migrants.
43 The rate in Cyprus, for example, is five times higher.
44 One-third of cases are resolved within two months, but over half are still under review after six months. (Home Office, ibid.).
ability to adapt and integrate into a new community. Asylum seekers’ aspirations can be constrained by responsibilities for dependants and by depression, which is itself aggravated by limitations on asylum seekers’ ability to work and learn. The policy of dispersing asylum seekers around the country (mainly in the North) increases the problems of integration by separating them from informal community-support networks. The prohibition on work and learning while asylum seekers’ claims are considered inevitably affects their ability to integrate and maintain self-respect and a sense of identity.

**Where do immigrants come from?**

The largest group migrating both in to and out of Britain are British. Apart from British migrants, in 2006, 177,000 came in and 392,000 left\(^45\). The largest inflows were of people from Poland and India, followed by people from Pakistan, China and Australia. The largest outflows were of Australians and US citizens.

Figure 3 charts the net inflow by citizenship status over a decade. The most striking feature is the surge in migration following the expansion of the EU in 2004, probably the largest proportionate wave of immigration in British history. 2004 was also a peak year for immigration from Commonwealth countries. Figure 3 also shows a low but stable inflow of citizens from old (white) Commonwealth countries, for whom movement is relatively easy. Most of these people are not visibly different from the host population and they are helped by having English as a first language and coming from an education and qualification systems very like the UK’s. New Commonwealth

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\(^{45}\) Sriskandarajah (2007).
migration is predominantly from India, where ethnic and religious difference may be significant, but some aspects of culture and the education systems are relatively familiar.

Do immigrants stay?

While some migrants plan to start a new life as permanent residents and citizens of a new country, others expect to stay only for a few months or years and then return, while yet others plan to commute between two or more countries across their working lives.

Historically, migrants have tended to stay longer than they intended, but there are several reasons why this may not be the case for the most recent immigrants from Eastern Europe (three-quarters of them from Poland – the largest of the A8 countries). Immigrants from Eastern Europe are young, with significant numbers coming to Britain for their first full-time jobs, and therefore they are less settled in their career plans. Eastern Europeans are travelling shorter distances than previous migrant groups and have access to easier and cheaper travel. They also now have freer movement within the rest of the EU (since other member states have now opened their borders). Unlike those migrating from less developed countries, the relative economic advantage of working in Britain may not be lasting for Eastern Europeans as rapidly falling birth rates in Eastern Europe create labour shortages, and a downturn in the economic cycle in Britain makes work less attractive or less available here, and reduces the relative value of UK earnings.

One useful model for understanding the patterns of A8 migration distinguished four groups46: ‘searchers’, who have not yet decided whether to stay; ‘stayers’, who have chosen to settle permanently; ‘storks’, coming only for seasonal work; and ‘hamsters’ accumulating capital for a return home. The last two groups remain firmly rooted in their national cultures (here and in the home countries), while the former two are much more interested in integration.

More are applying for citizenship

Application for citizenship is a step further down the route to permanent residence and creates a new set of learning needs. There are six forms of British nationality, with complex legal requirements, but to become a British citizen an applicant must be able to demonstrate both an adequate command of English (ESOL Entry Level 3) and an appropriate knowledge of language and life in the UK (by passing the ‘Life in the UK’ test). Exemption may be given to applicants who are over 65 or who have a physical or mental impairment.

As Figure 4 shows, the number of citizenship applications granted rose steadily from 2000 to 2005, when it peaked (immediately before the introduction of formal

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46 Garapich (2007).
citizenship tests). The number has now fallen somewhat to 149,000 in 2006. Half of all applications are on the basis of five-year residence, and people from Asia account for 40 per cent of all applications.

Citizenship application raises a very specific educational need: applicants need to prepare for the ‘Life in the UK’ test, which requires a substantial knowledge of issues about British society, laws and customs (many of which most native British citizens would find hard to answer, and which raise questions about the nature of the citizenship of those born here).47)

The impact of migration on labour markets is generally positive

Employers’ attitudes to migrants are generally positive. A study in 2006 found employers recruiting migrants not because native-born staff were not available, but because migrants were perceived to be more motivated and with fewer constraints on flexible working.48 However, employers’ attitudes to refugees and asylum seekers are less positive, reflecting the lower skills in these groups and, perhaps, the very negative media coverage over recent years.

The impact of migrants is generally to stimulate growth and fill gaps. Contrary to popular belief, most economists are agreed that migrants do not, overall, displace British workers (although this may arise sometimes in particular areas), because the number of jobs in the economy varies in response to the economic cycle, global

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47 For example: ‘What are the roles of whips in Parliament?’; ‘What is the Act of Succession?’; ‘Describe the composition and role of the European Union (EU)’; ‘What are two key features of the Civil Service?’

48 This may be less positive for the individuals concerned.
competition, exchange rates and skills. There is no historical evidence in Britain or Ireland (which has experienced much more dramatic fluctuations in migration in recent years\(^9\)) of any correlation between unemployment rates and migration flows at national or regional levels. Open economies like that in the UK more often adapt to the availability of labour (especially specialised skilled labour) by growing or shrinking output, or by changing product strategies, while their openness strengthens their long-term growth potential. If anything, by stimulating the economy, migrants increase the number of jobs. The common perception that migrants take jobs from native-born workers may be partly the result of confusions between the impact of migration and other kinds of labour market change, including privatisation and the introduction of agency working, which lower entry barriers for some migrants.

Migrants also play an important role in filling low-skilled jobs, which settled British workers are reluctant to take on, especially in sectors like distribution, hotels and catering, manufacturing and agriculture\(^{50}\); for example, two-thirds of the hotel and catering workforce in London are migrants\(^{51}\). Although the long-term trend in Britain has been towards rising levels of skill, the Institute for Employment Research predicts that, in the medium term, 25 per cent of UK jobs will remain in low-skilled work, and that the proportion will not fall rapidly even in the long term. Furthermore, demand for labour in such jobs is likely to remain high, because much low-skilled work is done by older, less well-qualified people, who will be retiring, and younger generations of British-born people are reluctant to follow them into such work.

### The migrant labour market is polarised

The migrant labour market is polarised by level of skill, employment, gender, language and country of origin.

The skills of migrants vary greatly. Immigration controls aim to ensure that only high-skilled people and those in skills shortage areas\(^{52}\) are allowed to enter Britain from outside the EU; however, EU citizens have a right of entry regardless of skills level\(^{53}\). A further problem is the absence of effective arrangements for the recognition of qualifications. Many highly skilled migrants end up either having to repeat lengthy and expensive training, or to take jobs well below their capacities, resulting in a serious waste of resources. Strategies which assume that employers will invest in the skills of their workers are unrealistic in many cases, because firms often have no jobs that could make use of the real skills and qualifications of their migrant workers.

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\(^{49}\) During Ireland’s most recent economic boom, it experienced inflows of more than 1 per cent of total population every year for five years without any impact on unemployment levels.

\(^{50}\) Gilpin et al. (2006).

\(^{51}\) Vertovec (2006).

\(^{52}\) Currently 192 occupations, designated by the Government’s Migration Advisory Committee.

\(^{53}\) Although the jobs are low skilled, it does not follow that the workers are low skilled – 70 per cent of Polish migrants are graduates.
Employment patterns vary considerably by country of origin. Among most migrant groups, men’s employment rates are higher than for UK-born men, with rates for those coming from the A8 countries highest (84 per cent for Polish men, for example), partly reflecting the youth of these people\textsuperscript{54}. Migrants from A8 countries also work longer hours than the British workforce as a whole do. However, employment rates are not universally higher among migrant groups: they are much lower among men from Somalia, Angola, Iran, Albania and Ethiopia\textsuperscript{55}.

Employment levels of migrant women from Somalia, Angola, Iran, Albania and Ethiopia are, in general, lower still than those of men. Employment levels are also much lower among women from Pakistan, Bangladesh, China and Sri Lanka\textsuperscript{56}. In many cases, this reflects strong cultural expectations that women will remain at home, especially when caring for young children and older relatives\textsuperscript{57}. Special educational programmes (supported by appropriate guidance, mentoring and work experience) may be necessary to support people from these communities who face particular barriers to employment.

It is important to distinguish vocational skills from language ones. Some highly qualified migrants have no English at all. Others have some English but lack appropriate occupational English to pursue their established careers in Britain. Others may have very good English but few formal qualifications in any occupational area.

**Ties outside Britain bring opportunities and challenges**

Some migrants have broken all ties with their countries of origin, but many retain strong links with family and friends, assisted by cheap electronic communication and relatively easy international travel. Some national and religious groups have very strong global networks, and some people see themselves as citizens of the world or global commuters.

All migrants have mixed feelings about the balance between preserving values and traditions of their old lives and adopting those of the host communities, and the experience may be very different for men and women. External links bring opportunities for trade and cultural links, but also pose challenges. For refugees, in particular, attitudes to life in Britain may be coloured by anxieties and guilt about those left behind (alive or dead) and about keeping in touch with families who may be widely dispersed around the globe. Many migrants work to support dependants in their countries of origin, and such financial transfers (estimated at £3.5 billion per annum) make a significant impact on the economies of some countries.

\textsuperscript{54} Green et al. (2008).
\textsuperscript{55} Learning and Skills Council (2007).
\textsuperscript{56} Khan (2008).
\textsuperscript{57} Ward and Spacey (2009).
The English language is the biggest challenge

Lack of English, or of appropriate English, is a significant factor in social exclusion and a barrier to the integration of most migrant groups. The life chances of those with no English at all depend critically on their ability to learn it. In the absence of the opportunity to learn English, migrants may remain trapped within migrant sub-cultures, vulnerable to exploitation and social exclusion, and without the opportunity to make a full contribution to, and fully benefit from, life in Britain. This is a particular issue for women from the Indian sub-continent whose domestic responsibilities often conflict with attendance at classes. Immigrants with fluent English are 20 per cent more likely to be in work, and are likely to earn 20 per cent more than do those with poor English language.

There are three broadly distinct groups with English language (ESOL) needs:

• recent migrants and their dependants;
• settled residents, mainly women;
• refugees and asylum seekers.

Since 2001, funding for ESOL tuition has expanded, trebling between 2001 and 2005. Demand for ESOL tuition has expanded even more rapidly, however, which has led to difficult policy decisions on priorities between groups (long- and short-term migrants, refugees, economic migrants and settled communities), very long waiting lists across the country and a shortage of adequately qualified teachers.

Government policy has been to concentrate resources on those perceived to have the greatest needs and those who have made a commitment to stay in Britain, and to require others to make a contribution to the cost of tuition. However, currently, some people in employment on low incomes are charged fees they cannot afford because, especially, many have financial obligations to dependants, here and in their countries of origin, or are dependent on husbands who are not willing to support their learning. The problems are compounded by the growing dispersal of migrants across the country, which means that many are in isolated areas, well away from formal education provision, and without easy access to transport.

In October 2008, Ofsted reported on the quality of ESOL provision. It found improving quality and good learner progression, but that the (relatively new) work-related ESOL programmes tended to be narrowly focused. In many places, elements of citizenship education were routinely included in ESOL programmes, although the aims and outcomes of this learning were not always clear. However, Ofsted found that there had been a drop in enrolments following the introduction of new fee policies, and providers had found employers resistant to paying for ESOL for employees (and many women do not have employers in any case).

58 Bloch (2002).
2.5 Likely trends in migration

Trends in international migration depend on a range of unpredictable factors, including the scale and distribution of global economic growth, and levels of political instability. Within Europe, fluctuations in exchange rates, and the relative health of national economies, make living and working in one country rather than another more or less attractive, and will lead to mobility for those groups who can move most easily: economic migrants and especially the young.

It seems likely that:

• **labour market demand for migrants will continue.** The economic downturn of 2008 will reduce overall labour demand in Britain, but levels of retirement will be high because of the age profile of the British workforce. As a result, net labour demand will remain high in the medium term, encouraging continuing inward migration, including EU migration into low-skilled jobs;

• **there will be no new surge of immigration.** The sudden wave of migration from the A8 countries which followed the opening of borders in 2004 will not be repeated, because constraints are to be imposed on migration from the next countries to be admitted to the EU (and their populations are smaller60), the relative economic advantages are declining, and other EU countries have now opened their borders;

• **refugee inflow will remain stable.** Asylum applications have stabilised at a relatively low level, and they make relatively little economic impact. However, the uncertainties about asylum seekers’ status mean that their integration may continue to need careful managing;

• **internal migration within Britain will decrease** because of the economic downturn and the inflexibility of the housing market;

• **white British emigration levels will decline** as the decline in sterling undermines property prices and incomes from UK earnings;

• **non-British emigration will rise** as the relative economic advantage of Britain declines. This is particularly likely among A8 migrants, who are the most mobile;

• **economic recession will increase potential tensions** in areas most vulnerable to unemployment, where migrants may be seen as unfairly competing for jobs and resources.

60 With the exception of Turkey.
3. Social cohesion

3.1 Defining social cohesion

Migration is about new people moving to new countries, areas and neighbourhoods; cohesion is about how integrated those communities are, and can be measured by how strongly people feel themselves to be members of a community. Unlike assimilation, which seeks to simply incorporate new groups into the mainstream culture, cohesion seeks to enable all groups to contribute their own distinctive ideas and values to an evolving community.

Understandably, political attention is often focused on those who do not integrate, especially when they are perceived to have allegiances outside Britain which are in some way threatening to the host community. However, in a healthy community, cohesion is pursued as part of everyday mainstream life, and not simply as a reaction to exceptional outbreaks of civil unrest, political alienation and violence.

The Commission on Integration and Cohesion has proposed a new definition of integration and cohesion in a community:

- There is a clearly defined and widely shared sense of the contribution of different individuals and different communities to a future vision for a neighbourhood, city, region or country.

- There is a strong sense of an individual’s rights and responsibilities when living in a particular place – people know what everyone expects of them and what they can expect in turn.

- Those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities, access to services and treatment.

- There is a strong sense of trust in institutions locally to act fairly in arbitrating between different interests and for their role and justifications to be subject to public scrutiny.

- There is a strong recognition of the contribution of both those who have newly arrived and those who already have deep attachments to a particular place, with a focus on what they have in common.

- There are strong and positive relationships between people from different backgrounds in the workplace in schools and other institutions within neighbourhoods.

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61 Confusingly, ‘community’ is commonly used to refer to people from a particular country or ethnic or religious group. In this paper we use it to refer only to a neighbourhood.
3.2 How cohesive are British communities?

In general, levels of social cohesion are relatively good in Britain. The Government’s Citizenship survey\textsuperscript{62} shows that 82 per cent of people think that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together, and that this percentage is highest among the oldest groups, and has been rising. Perceptions of cohesion do not vary greatly by ethnic group. In only ten of the 387 local areas surveyed did the proportion reporting that people get on well fall below 60 per cent. However, a much higher proportion of people think that social cohesion nationally is worse than locally\textsuperscript{63}.

The Commission on Integration and Cohesion argued that while cohesion is relatively strong, it is not stable and needs continuing promotion. It also stressed that levels of cohesion vary greatly according to highly local factors: while the Commission found no inevitable link between low levels of social cohesion and deprivation, it did find particular problems in areas experiencing diversity for the first time and in ethnically diverse areas experiencing new waves of migration. The Commission particularly highlighted communities where groups are living what Cantle et al.\textsuperscript{64} call ‘parallel lives’, and especially where people believe (rightly or wrongly) that resources are not being fairly distributed between groups.

Communities are becoming less alike

The nature of diversity and its intensity change over time. Recent analysis of census data since 1970 shows a progressive pattern of polarisation, with regions and localities becoming less alike in terms of age mix, wealth, social isolation and political engagement\textsuperscript{65}. At the same time, localities have become less polarised in terms of race and ethnicity (minority groups are much more widely dispersed than in 1970, and incidents of direct racial or ethnic conflict are rarer) and educational participation (the tenfold expansion of numbers of higher education students during this period has spread social opportunities more widely, although such opportunities are still concentrated by class, parental education and income).

High-risk areas

The Commission on Integration and Cohesion identified five kinds of area where migration poses particular challenges:

- **changing, less affluent rural areas experiencing migration for the first time**, notably in the East of England, with the influx of A8 migrants into agriculture and food processing;

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\textsuperscript{62} Department of Communities and Local Government (2009).
\textsuperscript{63} This is a known phenomenon, found, for example, in research into attitudes to the NHS, where surveys repeatedly find that individuals’ personal experience is very positive, while they report that the NHS nationally is poor.
\textsuperscript{64} Cantle et al. (2006).
\textsuperscript{65} Dorling et al. (2008).
• **stable, less affluent areas with manufacturing decline**, mainly in the North and Midlands, especially textile towns where communities have lived ‘parallel lives’, sometimes for many years;

• **stable, less affluent areas without manufacturing decline**, where house prices are low, including some in the South East;

• **changing, less affluent urban areas**, with high demand for low-skilled workers;

• **special cases** – areas without deprivation, but where a specific incident or planning proposal (e.g., for an asylum seekers’ centre) has caused local tensions.

As the Commission points out, migration and diversity are rarely the immediate cause of tension. Rather, they compound existing disadvantage.

**The rise of super-diversity**

An important phenomenon of the last decade has been the growth and spread of ‘super-diverse’ communities. Between 1950 and 1980, most migration was from former colonies or Commonwealth countries with historic cultural and economic ties to Britain. Groups tended to settle in particular areas, and local authorities needed to interact only with a small number of representative organisations from one or two minority groups, often through male representatives, in a relatively homogenous host community.

Since 1980, this pattern has changed dramatically with a plethora of different minority groups living alongside one another in many cities and, more recently, in some small towns. For example, Wrexham, with very few community language speakers in 2000, reported 25 languages in its schools in 200566. Vertovec describes the dimensions of ‘super-diversity’67 in terms of:

• **country of origin** (comprising a variety of possible subset traits such as ethnicity, language(s), religious tradition, regional and local identities, cultural values and practices);

• **migration channel** (often related to highly gendered flows and specific social networks);

• **legal status** (determining entitlement to rights);

• **human capital** (particularly educational background);

• **access to employment** (which may or may not be in immigrants’ hands),

• **transnationalism** (emphasising how migrants’ lives are lived with significant reference to places and peoples elsewhere);

• **responses by local authorities, services providers and local residents** (which often tend to function by way of assumptions based on previous experiences with migrants and ethnic minorities).’

London is the extreme case, as perhaps the most diverse city in human history. London has residents born in 179 countries (30 per cent of them from developed and 70 per cent from developing countries), and more than 10,000 people from each of 42 countries. More than 300 first languages are spoken by children in London schools, and five languages have more than 50,000 native speakers. In three London boroughs, more than a third of the population was born outside Britain. Recent years have seen the arrival of new migrant groups from countries with no historical or cultural links to Britain, like Algeria and the Congo. However, even the most concentrated groups are increasingly dispersed. While London is a special case, this pattern of super-diversity is increasingly common across the country.

A further dimension of complexity comes from diversity within national communities: in some cases, migrant communities bring with them a long history of religious, political or cultural conflicts in their countries of origin. In such circumstances, it may be actively unhelpful for Local Government to engage with ‘community representatives’.

A related phenomenon is ‘super-mobility’ with some migrant groups and individuals moving repeatedly within the UK in response to fluctuations in the labour market or to changing requirements of their legal status. This population churn creates special challenges for community cohesion and local services. However, accurate data is difficult to obtain, because several movements can happen between sampling dates for data collection. The most reliable source is records of school admissions, which show that schools in some areas have more than 50 per cent turnover of children in a year; one study found a school where the proportion rose above 90 per cent.

3.3 Diversity and identity

One result of growing migration and the dispersal of minority groups is a growing complexity of identities, for individuals and communities. For some people, a single identity is being replaced, or supplemented, by more complex and flexible identities based on locality and nation, history and religion, profession and class, as well as membership of a host of interest groups, while some people see themselves as having trans-national identities. Furthermore, frequent movement is becoming more common, with people (especially, but not only, young adults) moving between countries or regions several times, sometimes going back to their countries of origin for a time before returning to the new community. Improvements in communication (both the internet and air travel) make it easier for some to sustain family ties and social and employment networks across countries and continents. However, the

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68 Vertovec (2006).
69 Ibid.
70 The census takes place only every ten years; the Labour Force Survey and the British Household Panel Survey are more frequent but less comprehensive.
71 Cantle (2008).
process of migration can be disorienting, and religious affiliation can be important in retaining a sense of core values and identity in an unfamiliar setting.

3.4 Aspects of diversity

Ethnic mix

Although most migrants are not ethnically different from the British population, migration is often associated with ethnic difference, with Black and Asian people born in Britain often viewed as ‘immigrants, while recent white immigrants, especially from English-speaking countries, are more rapidly assimilated.

The distribution of the 8 per cent of the British population who described themselves as not White British in the 2001 census is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: The UK population: ethnic minorities by ethnic group

However, while the census is relatively reliable, data collected for other purposes (like monitoring of people in lifelong learning) is much less complete because of complex and changing definitions, reluctance of people to declare their ethnicity, and a proportion of people working or living illegally in the country.

Minority ethnic groups have rather different fertility and mortality patterns from those of White British people. When they first arrive, most migrant groups have higher fertility rates than the native population, but these usually fall towards the white British norm within a generation. In all groups, fertility rates decline in this way, but in people of South Asian origin, the decline has been slower, and their fertility rate remains above replacement rate, meaning that people of Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Indian origin will form a growing proportion of the population in the future.
The scale of ethnic mixing is growing rapidly, incidents of direct racial conflict are rarer than 30 years ago, and ONS estimates suggest that the group describing themselves as ‘mixed’ in the 2001 census will grow by 40 per cent between the 2001 and 2011 censuses. By that time, a third of all non-white people will fall into the ‘Mixed’ category. However, ‘Mixed’ is not a group for the purposes of policymaking, because the people have little in common except non-membership of one of the other groups, and they have no common pattern of life experience.

**Language**

The UK has become more linguistically diverse. Data is limited, however: a question on languages spoken will be introduced into the census for the first time in 2011. The Annual Population Survey in 2006 estimated that over 2 million people speak a language other than English in the home, and almost all of these were born outside the UK. Half of the people who speak a language other than English in the home are in London, which has by far the highest concentration of people speaking English as a second language. In London, 90 per cent of Bangladeshis and 75 per cent of Pakistanis speak another language in the home.

One measure of linguistic diversity is the number of children in school whose first language is not English; this is surveyed annually by the DCSF, which indicates that at least 300 first languages are spoken in British schools. It is likely that this number underestimates the number of languages in the adult population, since the population includes adults without children.

Fourteen languages are spoken in more than a third of English local authorities, but the concentration of populations varies considerably. Figure 6 shows that the largest groups in terms of pupil numbers are speakers of Punjabi, Urdu, Bengali and Guajarati, with between 40,000 and 100,000 first-language speakers each; these languages are also the most concentrated (albeit across a large number of authorities). The next largest groups, on the other hand, are much more thinly spread, with the Chinese-speaking population very thinly distributed.

There is substantial evidence that bilingualism has positive effects on educational development, including the ability to acquire further languages. The maintenance of the first language is a high priority for many linguistic minority groups, and at least 61 languages other than English are taught to children, either in state schools or in complementary schools. The most commonly taught languages in complementary schools are Arabic, Bengali, Chinese, Turkish and Urdu, especially in order to pass on the history, culture and religion of the country.

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73 Department for Children, Schools and Families.
74 The number is imprecise because schools may have difficulty identifying some of the rarer languages, and there can be double counting through the use of generic groupings like ‘Chinese’. 
75 CILT (2005).
Age balance

Overall, the population is ageing, with a decline in the proportion of children and young people, and a rise in the proportion of people past retirement. Life expectancy has been growing steadily for a century as a result of improvements in diet, living conditions and medical treatments. Women’s life expectancy is still higher than men’s, but the two have been gradually converging, perhaps as a result of the decline of heavy manual labour for men. Women are more likely than men to be exposed to poverty on widowhood. Male and female retirement ages are converging76.

In 2006, 16 per cent of the population was aged over 65, and this percentage is expected to rise to 20 per cent by 2026. However, life expectancy varies by social class and locality, with professionals on average living seven years longer than unskilled workers.

The ageing of the white population is offset to some extent by migrant groups, which have a higher proportion of young people and, currently, lower life expectancy77. As the current generation ages, the ethnic balance of the population will change, with a particular decline in minority ethnic numbers among the 16–25-year-old group (which currently dominates further and higher education).

Age is one dimensions of polarisation, with regions and localities becoming either older or younger. Age distribution across the country can be measured by the proportion of people who would have to move to produce an exactly even distribution. In 1970,

76 McNair (2009).
this proportion was 5.3 per cent, but by 2006 it had risen to 7.3 per cent (equivalent to 4.3 million people). Imbalance affects two groups: people aged 20–29, concentrated in university towns and urban areas with large labour markets, and people over 60, concentrated particularly in coastal areas.

**Gender**

Gender is a significant factor in patterns of migration. Two-thirds of asylum seekers are men (mainly from Algeria, Nepal, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Yemen and Albania), while 40 per cent of migrants for family reunion are women. Women, however, constitute two-thirds of migrants from Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, the Philippines, Thailand and Madagascar.

Migrant women face extra barriers to employment and integration. For women from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Somalia in particular, cultural expectations that women will stay at home to look after children and elderly relatives restrict access to ESOL, wider education and training, and work. Where the women do not live in a neighbourhood with other people of similar background, they also suffer from a lack of the support networks of family and friends which would be central to their lives in their countries of origin. This isolation is perhaps most severe for trafficked women, who may be invisible to all public services.

On the other hand, migration can also be empowering for women, giving them access to opportunities denied them by cultural expectations in their countries of origin.

**Religion**

Religion is an important dimension of people’s sense of identity, especially for newly arrived migrants, for whom religious values and religious organisations can be an important source of support. In the 2001 census, three-quarters of all people declared a religious affiliation, and three-quarters of these were Christian. Other major groups are Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists. The oldest group, the Jewish community, has been established in Britain since the seventeenth century, with major expansion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Other groups arrived later, and all non-Christian religious groups are becoming more widely distributed as minority groups disperse across the country.

The Christian church still has established status; leaders of the other faith groups in general support the continuation of this, seeing the recognition of a religious dimension to public life as important in resisting what is sometimes thought to be a hedonistic secular culture.

Religion has become a more important marker of difference and a more contentious subject following terrorist incidents in New York and London; this, alongside

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78 Vertovec (2006).
international political tensions, has strengthened a sense of difference among some young people. Most religious leaders, of all faiths, now seek closer working relationships. There is a wide consensus that the trend towards ‘multiculturalism’ in public policy, which was designed to cultivate respect for difference, has led too far towards segregation.

Religious groups play an important part in fostering social cohesion, at least within their own faith communities: they are major providers of social care and mutual support, both to their own members and to disadvantaged people more widely; they are contributors and organisers of charitable and voluntary activity; and they provide a strong sense of community for their members. Many religious groups are also important contributors to informal adult learning.

**Wealth**

Over some decades, all areas have become wealthier, but the gap between the most and least wealthy areas has grown, partly because of the concentration of personal wealth in housing (although this may be changed by the current recession). In the three poorest regions – Scotland, the North East and Yorkshire – the proportion of people defined as ‘breadline poor’ rose from 20 per cent in 1970 to 30 per cent in 2000.

**Social isolation**

The proportion of people with only loose ties to their neighbourhood and to other people has risen markedly over the last 30 years. The Sheffield index of ‘anomie’ (a measure of the strength of an individual’s social connections, where high scores represent high levels of isolation) rose from 18.7 per cent in 1971 to 26.2 per cent in 2001. Changing migration patterns may well have increased scores still further since 2001. The three regions with the highest scores are London, the South West and Scotland (all over 28 per cent), and the lowest score was in the West Midlands (23 per cent).

**Political engagement**

The proportion of people not voting in general elections has risen steadily from 20 per cent in the elections of the 1940s and 50s to 36 per cent in the last three general elections. Furthermore, the gap between the proportion of people not voting in the regions most likely to vote and in those least likely to do so has increased from 5.8 per cent to 7.7 per cent. Non-voting is most likely in London (38 per cent) and least likely in the West and South West (31 per cent).

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80 Cooper and Lodge (2008).
81 This index uses census data on non-married adults, single-person households, people who moved house within the last year, and people in privately rented accommodation, to measure degrees of social isolation.
3.5 Expectations of learning

For several decades, policy in lifelong learning assumed that non-participation in learning was a matter of barriers to be overcome. More recently, a more complex view has emerged, partly recognising that much learning happens without formal instruction, and that much of the learning that takes place in workplaces and communities is not recorded in any way. In addition, it has become clear that many people do not see the relevance of learning, in any identifiable sense, to their lives. In the context of social cohesion, learning may not be the first priority even if individuals do recognise a need. Research into migrant groups\(^{82}\) finds a range of competing priorities, including:

- **domestic caring** – it is natural that the maintenance of family unit and protecting dependants takes priority; it is the first call on time and energy, especially for women, and particularly those from cultures where caring is seen as women’s primary role;

- **reluctance to invest in oneself** – it is common for people to feel that investing in their learning is a personal luxury which should be a low priority by comparison with the needs of other family members (including not only spouses, children and parents, but also dependants in the country of origin);

- **unequal prior education** – some migrants have little previous education or come from cultures where access to learning is very unevenly available. They may well feel (as do some native British people) that education and training is not for people like them;

- **cultural expectations of learning** – people in many cultures take a more formal view of learning and see it only as something leading to academic qualifications, and not relevant to the immediate problems of everyday life, although many have very high expectations of the benefits which participation will bring. The view that you can be too old to learn, which is widely held across society in general, is particularly hard on women who stay at home into their 50s to raise children.

\(^{82}\) Waddington (2008).
4. The role of lifelong learning

4.1 Diversity and resilience

Each of us has several identities, as a citizen, partner, parent, member of a profession or trade, employee, resident in a neighbourhood, and member of a religion (or no religion) and often of a range of interest groups. Identity is also profoundly shaped by gender, the impact of which varies between cultures. It is the combination of these aspects that creates a unique human being. The more such connections we have, the better able we are to cope with the pressures and risks of life – our diversity makes us resilient. Conversely, when we feel that our identity is rooted in a single dimension – be it a sense of ‘what my community has always been like’ or the idea that a particular set of values are absolute – we are much more likely to feel threatened if that one dimension is challenged. It is also true that the interaction of these characteristics can lead to an intensification of discrimination and disadvantage.

Communities are also multi-faceted. Where a community is built around a single industry, it can be devastated by a single technological or economic change. Some shattered communities take a generation to recover, and others never do (as with some former mining and manufacturing communities). On the other hand, where a community is diverse and is capable of using that diversity creatively, it is more capable of coping with change and challenges from outside.

Moving home, and the factors which cause people to move, are a major cause of disruption in identity. However far they have come, people moving home have lost (at least) an everyday attachment to a neighbourhood; many have lost an occupational identity and friends; some will find their values and faith challenged by people with unfamiliar views and behaviour. Some will lack the language to integrate easily, and others will be hindered by issues of legal status, frequent moving or unemployment. Some people move as a result of disruption to relationships – leaving home, divorce or financial problems – which make re-establishing identity difficult.

If we are to create cohesive and dynamic communities, we need to ensure that people have as many opportunities as possible to put down roots, particularly through stable residence and work, and that the barriers to doing this are minimised. It follows that a major priority for public policy should be to strengthen a sense of membership of community, including the communities of the workplace and neighbourhood.

4.2 Three dimensions of lifelong learning

Change can be a threat or an opportunity. By definition, learning, in all its forms, focuses on change and preparing for the future. For individuals, learning can be described in terms of three broad and overlapping purposes, which are:
• **learning to make a contribution/‘vocational’ learning** – acquiring the skills, knowledge and understanding needed for paid and unpaid work. This sort of learning is traditionally described in terms of developing human capital and linked to paid employment, although in a world where retirement is extending and unemployment rising, it may be more appropriate to think of it in terms of paid and unpaid work (and the boundaries between paid and unpaid work shift over time and between cultures83);

• **learning to be part of a community/‘social’ learning** – learning the skills and understanding to be a constructive member of a community, be it a family, neighbourhood, profession or trade, or nation. This learning helps build ‘social capital’, the complex range of networks and relationships which bind communities together, building mutual trust and enabling them to work effectively to achieve common purposes. Community cohesion depends on the strength of social capital, but increasing geographical mobility and diversity make it more difficult to build and maintain cohesion. Lifelong learning can provide opportunities for people to build trust and relationships by learning alongside people from different backgrounds. Here the connection between subject of the learning and outcome is less close;

• **learning to be an individual/personal learning** – learning to be resilient, adaptable and confident, with a strong sense of your own identity and control over your life. This is something which can be developed through many kinds of learning, and often through the way in which a subject is taught rather than the subject itself. It is one of the outcomes most frequently described by students in non-vocational adult education.

Although these purposes are distinct, they interlock and support each other: a creative economy and society depends on all its people having a confident sense of their own identity, as well as good skills and knowledge and the ability to work together. Where policy focuses too heavily on one of the three dimensions of learning, or sees the title of a course as describing all its purposes or outcomes, the result may be less effective learning, even in the fields it is focusing on.

Lifelong learning can help to make diversity positive for both individuals and communities in four ways, by:

- **providing people with the skills and capabilities** they need to make a full contribution to the economy and society;
- **bringing whole communities together** for shared learning activity across traditional boundaries of age, ethnicity and religion;
- **helping vulnerable groups and communities** to overcome their disadvantages;
- **increasing the range of cultural and interest groups** where people can form new shared identities.

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83 For example, caring roles which are carried out in some cultures and countries by family members on an unpaid basis are carried out by paid employees in others.
4.3 Four policy principles for lifelong learning

If lifelong learning is to support social cohesion and ensure that migrants of all kinds can integrate rapidly into their new homes, it needs to reflect four core principles, which are to:

- welcome newcomers promptly;
- prioritise integration;
- encourage contribution;
- focus on the future.

These principles will drive policy only if they are shared by all parties in the policymaking community, including Government departments and agencies which sometimes have divergent objectives. Key parties include the DIUS, Home Office, DCSF, Department of Health, UK Border Agency, Prison Service, Regional Development Agencies, Learning and Skills Council, local authorities and Local Strategic Partnerships.

Welcome newcomers promptly

It is when people first arrive that they are most motivated to learn. The sooner new arrivals have a chance to build links into their new communities, the more likely they are to be integrated and become contributing members. Speed of response to new arrivals is therefore important. Long waiting lists or legislative barriers to participation teach individuals that they are not welcome and help them to learn to survive without becoming members of mainstream society. This is not good for the individual or for society (although some migrants have more urgent priorities, like housing or family reunion, which mean that learning has to be deferred).

Unlike some EU countries, Britain does not offer a national induction programme to new arrivals to help them quickly understand expectations and services available, although some programmes do exist, run by third-sector organisations and individual (sometimes temporary) projects. There is a case for developing such programmes more widely and perhaps more consistently, to speed up the process of integration.

A more radical approach would be to offer free enrolment to anyone enrolling for the first time on any publicly funded programme in a given area. The cost would be relatively low but would provide a powerful tool to encourage participation in learning and social integration. A free programme would be an attractive offer for many people and would rapidly offer them a network of social contacts, whether they have moved 50 miles or from another continent. Such a programme would encourage people to see lifelong learning as a key element of their identity in the community, and make learning a visible and creative part of citizenship.

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84 Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills.
85 Department for Children, Schools and Families.
Prioritise integration

Priority should be given (wherever possible) to educational strategies which encourage people to learn together rather than in separate segregated groups. Separate provision should normally be seen as a transitional stage while people develop confidence and, where necessary, language skills.

Until recently, public policy tended to adopt a multicultural approach to services, in order to strengthen the sense of identity and pride among members of minority groups. However, this has sometimes led, as the Commission on Integration and Social Cohesion pointed out, to a growing segregation of communities and a growing potential for intercommunal tension. It is important that, wherever possible, services are provided on an integrated basis and individuals are helped to integrate and feel comfortable in such environments. This is not to propose that the aim should simply be to achieve assimilation. Diversity of cultures, languages and ideas should be seen as a strength to be built on and celebrated, but not a reason for segregation.

Trust is built by personal contact. However, opportunities for people to meet across divides of culture, language, origin and religion are relatively rare. Most public services provide support to people as individuals and do not actively seek to build relationships between people with different backgrounds or problems. Unlike such services, face-to-face adult education offers collective activity through which people can learn together about a vast range of topics, building confidence through working together on a shared interest or challenge, rather than learning in separate places about problems and differences. This is a powerful way of building trust, provided that staff are skilled in facilitating dialogue and making sure that all participants feel included and welcome. The opportunity to build trust is a powerful reason for providing a broad and accessible range of adult education programmes.

It is desirable to hold courses for newly arrived people in locations where other adult learning activity is taking place. This provides an opportunity to encourage informal contact, and to provide migrants with the chance to see the range of services available and feel part of the wider community, although some groups and individuals may need a degree of ‘sheltering’ at first.

Encourage contribution

Migrants bring experience, knowledge, networks and talents to their new homes. Education which helps people to develop assets and use them within the new community, and cultural events which celebrate the strengths of diversity, encourage migrants to feel like members of the community and encourage others to see them as contributors rather than dependants.

One cause of conflict within neighbourhoods is a belief that some people are getting an unfair advantage in the provision of public services. It is therefore important...
that migrants are seen to be contributing to the community as well as taking from it. It is important to actively seek opportunities to engage migrants in educational programmes as resources, building on their experience and background as a strength, rather than seeing migrants always as dependants. An example is the ‘living library’, where people can book time to talk to someone about their experience, culture, religion or history, and which offers a way for people who might otherwise feel isolated to make a contribution to the community. Learning opportunities can also be built around festivals and sporting and arts events\(^\text{87}\) which celebrate diversity and are more commonly used as a way of fostering community cohesion. Although some migrants have severed all contact with their home countries, many have extensive networks in one or many countries. Educational programmes can help individuals to find ways of capitalising on such networks in their new lives in Britain.

**Focus on the future**

People who believe that they have no future or that they have no control over it are more likely to fall back on old identities and perpetuate old divisions. The Commission on Integration and Cohesion argued for an approach to integration through the creation of a strong sense of local community, by:

- building attachment to, and awareness of, a particular location and its history;
- focusing on shared futures rather than historic differences;
- developing hospitality, respect and civility;
- developing confidence that individuals will be treated fairly by their communities and neighbours.

Learning is, by its nature, future focused, concentrating on positive change for the individual and for his or her community. Most migrants arrive with a strong, if unfocused, sense of a better future for themselves or their families, and are naturally highly motivated to learn. However, many of the processes of arriving and securing a right to stay for those seeking refuge do not support a future focus, and are likely to inhibit learning. Learning can encourage people to look forward, in terms of their own lives and that of their community.

A future is not only a future for the individual but also for the community. As the Commission on Integration and Cohesion argued, we need people to focus on building a shared future rather than rehearsing past divisions. It follows that we need to strengthen civic education. Education is not propaganda, and it is not the business of education to promote particular views of community relations or community cohesion. However, it is a proper role of education services to encourage discussion and debate within communities, developing the civic capacity which enables individuals to understand the forces shaping their lives and how to influence them.

\(^{87}\) One city, for example, organised a cricket match between imams and vicars, refereed by a rabbi.
Such education should provide people (from the settled community as well as newcomers) with space to explore visions of the future of their communities, using their diverse pasts as a resource rather than a tool to divide, and increasing understanding of opportunities and constraints. This is more than the rather limited notion of citizenship education operating in schools or in courses preparing people for the Citizenship test: it involves helping people to understand and explore issues, develop the skills to challenge the views of others, and respond in turn to such challenges from others.

In recent years, education for civic and political purposes has been in decline. While the provision of such education is not a simple task, especially for Government (national or local), a growth of civic education, and a revival of such programmes would be very good for social cohesion.

4.4 Leadership and policy

Integrate Government policy at national level

Securing a cohesive and dynamic society requires national leadership to build confidence that migration is healthy and not a threat, and that all will be treated fairly. Lifelong learning can encourage confidence by increasing people’s understanding of the issues and by giving people opportunities to meet and engage with each other across social, ethnic, religious and cultural divides.

However, migration, in particular international migration, is a politically sensitive issue, especially during times of economic contraction. Not all politicians (or employers) are willing to take on what the Cantle report described as the ‘heroic leadership’ shown in Oldham after the disturbances of 2001. Politicians are understandably nervous about appearing to favour particular groups, and may be concerned not to create for an area a reputation which will attract unmanageable numbers of migrants. Politicians may have difficulty in identifying who can speak for particular groups, an issue compounded by super-diversity and tensions within groups which may appear deceptively homogenous to outsiders. The issues are sometimes exacerbated by the media, whose proper role in exposing unfairness and abuse can sometimes inflame tensions.

It is important to build on the positive elements of the current situation. Migration patterns are stable, and if anything immigration is likely to decline in the next few years; levels of asylum applications and illegal immigration are relatively low; the evidence is clear that migration is good for the economy, both through increasing the skilled and unskilled labour supply, and by contributing new ideas to a dynamic economy. Immigrants can also contribute to maintaining the underlying social fabric88.

88 As, for example, when an influx of young adults increases demand for maternity services and keeps a local hospital open.
Give a clear lead role to Local Government

Although Central Government sets a policy framework and defines boundaries of nationality and citizenship, social cohesion happens at local level, and the nature of diversity varies greatly between areas. It follows that Local Government must have a central role in the management of community cohesion. Local Government is locally accountable, should be closest to the specific needs of particular communities, and is best placed to produce tailored responses to those needs and lead public opinion where necessary.

Leadership over cohesion and migration is as difficult at local level as it is nationally. The issues of cohesion and tension can be severe, and public opinion can be difficult to lead. Furthermore, local authority resources are under severe pressure, especially in those areas with high levels of immigration or churn, where resources do not always follow need as fast as is necessary. When there are many demands on local authority resources, it is understandable, but unfortunate, if local authorities prioritise other more immediate policy challenges.

Lifelong learning should be one dimension of a local policy response to diversity and migration. However, the progressive erosion of Local Government’s involvement in lifelong learning over recent decades has weakened its capacity to respond. Local Government needs once again to see learning for adults as a central element of the services it provides, and address its role in creating dynamic and cohesive communities.

4.5 Policy priorities

Prioritise the most vulnerable groups

In the context of migration, refugees and asylum seekers are the most conspicuously disadvantaged group, and although they form a very small proportion of migrants into Britain, they raise very particular and difficult issues. Firstly, asylum is a politically sensitive issue, making it difficult for national and local leadership to ensure informed debate and policymaking. Hostility or suspicion in the neighbourhood exposes asylum seekers to additional levels of stress.

The process of becoming a refugee and seeking asylum is stressful. Although they may have high levels of education, asylum seekers typically have experienced some form of trauma, and many struggle with anxiety and guilt about those left behind or dispersed elsewhere. Asylum seekers also have to live with uncertainty while an application is considered, with little control over where and how they live, with profound uncertainty about the future, and with complex regulations on what they can and cannot do. All these are inevitably disempowering and make any learning particularly difficult (since learning, by definition, requires a sense of a future). It is

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89 This is the result of the transfer of further education funding from local authorities to the Learning and Skills Council, and the freezing of total funding for adult and community learning at the level of local authority spending in 2001.
critical that any learning programme recognises these particular stresses and makes appropriate provision for personal support and mentoring in addition to formal tuition. One particular group in need of attention is women, whose access to wider society may be severely limited by language and by lack of access to the workplace (where many men establish new identities and acquire language skills). Women from cultural groups that place a high value on caring roles and gender segregation do aspire to acquire English language skills and work outside the home; outreach strategies which enable women to learn without compromising cultural expectations can therefore make a significant difference\(^9\)0.

**Address the needs of vulnerable communities**

Some communities are particularly at risk of social tensions. Usually, tension occurs where there are perceived resource conflicts over access to facilities, services or housing, where particular communities have become physically or socially isolated, where levels of poverty, exclusion and deprivation are high, and where local leadership is ambivalent about diversity. At a local level, it is important to recognise that fears of diversity and of unfair treatment are real, even if ill founded, and need to be addressed, and that there are communities, white and non-white, whose needs have been neglected and where alienation is strong among all groups.

The Commission on Integration and Cohesion identified five types of community where community cohesion was particularly at risk; they are all communities already under stress, where diversity and migration are compounding problems of poverty and economic change. The Commission identified the communities as:

- **changing, less affluent rural areas** (especially in the East of England) experiencing complex migration for the first time, notably Eastern European migrants working in agriculture and food processing;
- **stable, less affluent urban areas with manufacturing decline**, mainly in the North and Midlands. The primary issues here are deprivation and people living ‘parallel lives’ in informally segregated employment;
- **stable, less affluent urban areas without manufacturing decline**, and with low housing costs (making them attractive to poor people, including migrants). These areas are more widely spread across the country. The primary issue is deprivation, but conflict between white and non-white groups can also be an issue;
- **changing, less affluent urban areas**, including many coastal towns, where there is a high concentration of low-wage employment and perceived competition for employment;
- **special cases**, where a particular local event or proposal – like a planning proposal for new public housing or to create a centre for asylum seekers – highlights tensions between groups.

\(^9\)0 Ward and Spacey (2008).
Concern about the disadvantages faced by incoming migrants has sometimes
distracted local policymakers from the deprivation facing the communities into which
the migrants move. The result is, as the Cantle report\textsuperscript{91} points out, an increase in social
tension, particularly where incomers are perceived as being given unfair advantages
over existing residents, whose own problems may be quite severe. The logic is to
strengthen educational opportunity, linked to community development work across all
groups in disadvantaged communities.

\textsuperscript{91} Cantle (2001).
5. Proposals for action

5.1 Fund learning appropriately

The key driver of public lifelong learning policy is funding. Government further education policy focuses public spending (below higher education level) on individuals furthest from the labour market, to enable them to overcome the most severe barriers to work: low general and basic qualifications\(^{92}\). The expectation is that higher levels of learning, and learning more directly related to particular jobs, should be funded (wholly or partly) by employers, and that learning for interest should be the responsibility of individuals. Current policy also presents a particular challenge for migrants living on limited incomes, and especially refugees, many of whom have obligations to family (in Britain and in the country of origin) which they feel must make the first call on limited funds.

It is important to avoid simplistic categorisation of programmes: learning local history or literature may not seem a priority, but when it encourages people to understand the community they are moving into, and to learn about that alongside members of the host community, it may play an important role in integration.

Education providers have generally found employers resistant to contributing to the costs of ESOL and basic skills learning, despite the evidence of an economic return on such investment in reduced staff turnover, and improved communications and productivity, team-building, morale, health and safety compliance and customer service. Funding is a particular issue in low-skill industries or industries with a high concentration of migrants from a single country, where work can be managed in migrants’ native language. In areas with no tradition of migration, there may be few available teachers.

Three specific actions could make a significant improvement in accessibility and outcomes. These actions are to:

- **make ESOL up to Level 1 free.** NIACE has argued for this because of evidence of employers’ reluctance to invest in migrant workers\(^{93}\). Such funding would be in employers’ interest and address the risk of damage where non-English-speaking migrants fail to achieve a minimum level of communication;

- **offer career development loans** to new migrants to cover the cost of the education they need to become employable at an appropriate level. For some, this investment would produce a significant return;

- **offer a ‘welcome’ entitlement of a free first course** to all those moving into an area, to provide a way in to making new contacts, and to encourage people to see

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\(^{92}\) It is argued that engagement with employment is the most powerful tool for overcoming social exclusion, so a vocational learning policy also achieves social objectives. Policy in higher education, on the other hand, is driven by a different concern: to strengthen the knowledge base of the economy.

\(^{93}\) NIACE (2006).
learning as part of their new identity in their new home. This entitlement could be available, at relatively small cost, to all arrivals, whether they have come from within or outside the UK.

Whatever systems exist, it is important that guidance to providers, as well as to potential learners, should be clear about eligibility for funding, especially for groups like refugees and asylum seekers, whose status can be complex.

5.2 Provide integrated advice

Government is currently creating a universal Adult Advancement and Careers Service, recognising that mobile people in a flexible labour market need good impartial support to make decisions about learning and work throughout their lives. Government has stressed the importance of more than simply signposting people to relevant courses or job advertisements. People need support in making choices and carrying them through, and in sorting out the implications of their choices for finance, health and housing. For migrants from outside Britain, in particular, access to advice about learning and work needs to be linked to advice about complex issues of finance, health and citizenship. The new service will need to be well equipped to deal with the complex circumstances of international migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. It will also need to be able to deal with the needs of women returning to learning in later middle age after a very limited initial education.

The new Adult Advancement and Careers Service will need specialist expertise and good networks with public and voluntary agencies working with international migrants, because individuals can be suspicious of state agencies and prefer to work with people in their own language or neighbourhood. Third sector agencies set up to support particular communities or migrant groups are likely to be well informed about local circumstances and about the issues facing their client groups, but may not be well connected with mainstream education and training advice.

5.3 Improve ESOL

Improve access to ESOL

For most of those migrating into Britain from outside, the largest and most urgent issue is access to English language teaching. Courses in ESOL contribute to employability, community cohesion, overcoming racism, and improving health, housing, education and skills\(^\text{94}\). Research for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation found a strong correlation between English language skills and positive attitudes to English people and low levels of reported discrimination\(^\text{95}\).

Conversely, lack of English language is a major barrier to social cohesion and employment. If tuition is not available at the first possible opportunity, the initial urge

\(^{94}\) NIACE (2006).
\(^{95}\) Robinson and Reeve (2006).
to learn may be lost, and individuals develop strategies for surviving without English, which can trap them in low-skilled work and leave them vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.

There are broadly three groups with ESOL needs:

• **recent migrants** and their dependants, mainly from the EU. (This group makes up about 40 per cent of learners\(^96\).) Some of these see themselves as temporary migrants and use English in the workplace, but lead segregated lives, in their native languages, outside the workplace. This group includes many of the Polish ‘storks’ who come for seasonal work;

• **the settled community** (people, especially women, living here for more than five years) and their recently arrived dependants, including spouses. (This group makes up about 30 per cent of learners.) Many of these people have survived for some years in Britain but are unable to progress in work because of their lack of English. This group includes a high proportion of women, who may be trapped in low-skilled work with little access to society outside their particular ethnic communities. Some in this group have acquired a minimal amount of English to get by in areas where English is not commonly spoken;

• **refugees and people seeking asylum** (about 15 per cent of learners), are barred from publicly funded ESOL provision for the first six months when they arrive. If granted refugee status, these people become eligible to access ESOL on the same terms as anyone else, although providers do not always understand this.

Within all three of these groups, there are people whose language needs relate to employment, and those who are outside the labour market. A proportion of migrants develop only a survival level of English – language skills that are good enough to find a low-skilled job but not to progress to the level of their potential. The lack of a flexible credit framework makes the recognition of prior learning, and progression in learning and work more difficult. The priority of Jobcentre Plus – to place people in work as quickly as possible – has sometimes encouraged them to place people with low levels of English in jobs well below their skills and qualifications, increasing the trap\(^97\).

At present, the supply of ESOL programmes is inadequate, and asylum seekers are barred from taking part until their cases are decided\(^98\) (unless this takes over six months).

**Adopt a strategic approach to ESOL**

Proficiency in English is a critical factor in ensuring employability and social integration, and is directly relevant to the work of many Government departments and agencies, including the DIUS, DCSF, Home Office, Department of Health, UK Border Agency,
Prison Service, Regional Development Agencies, local authorities and Local Strategic Partnerships. It is therefore important that policy should be integrated at national and local level to ensure consistent treatment of learners and potential learners, and especially to secure continuity for those who are dealt with by several departments at different times.

Because of the diversity and complexity of migration, it is possible to identify the scale and nature of need only at local level. Local authorities are well placed to take a ‘whole community approach’ and consider ESOL needs as part of wider local planning arrangements, through Local Area Agreements and City Strategies, in partnership with voluntary organisations, which are often better placed to contact (and sometimes more trusted by) particular groups. Government has indicated an intention to give local authorities more control over how local ESOL funds are deployed. It will also be important for authorities to develop sensitive mechanisms for consulting with potential learners.

Third sector agencies working with migrant groups are an important channel for informing potential ESOL learners about opportunities and sometimes providing locations for tuition. For the groups that are the most hard to reach, third sector agencies may be particularly important.

**Improve ESOL for employment**

The majority of migrants come to work, and most eventually find work. Work gives migrants an identity, and may offer access to language and other tuition and the chance to practice English with workmates. Employment-related ESOL, both for work entry and for those already in work, is therefore a major priority, to foster integration as well as to enable migrants to be seen as contributing members of the community.

However, despite a general improvement in the quality of ESOL provision, there have been concerns about how relevant provision is (where it is available) to the needs of specific industries and occupations$^{99}$ and to people with higher levels of skill or previous education. Developing models for embedding ESOL in vocational training and providing induction for new migrants should be priorities.

The funding of ESOL provision is a problem, particularly because of the scale of need. Government believes that employers should be responsible for a proportion of the costs of ESOL for their workers (in line with broader policy on employers’ contribution to workforce training), but experience shows that this is a constraint on participation, because many employers do not provide support, and indeed sometimes benefit from non-English speaking workforces, managed in their home languages. Part of enabling migrants to progress – in work and learning – ought to be to enable them to acquire at least the basics of English, independent of their employer’s goodwill.

Self-employment is one way in which people on the margins of the labour market can find work. This approach can, at least in some cases, overcome problems of discrimination or unrecognised qualifications\(^{100}\), although it may also result in severe underemployment, which is a loss to both individual and community. However, there is little educational provision to help migrants understand the complexities of running a business in Britain.

Develop ESOL for people outside the labour market

Improving work-related ESOL does not solve all problems, however. Although the large majority of migrants are seeking work, among settled minority groups and some migrants, a significant group of people – including retired people, but mainly married women from particular countries – are not in the labour market, and can be entirely dependent on relatives and friends for communication outside their immediate communities. Overcoming language difficulties is a priority as a matter of human rights, and also because lack of English limits people’s ability to contribute to society, perpetuates social isolation and can lead to unacceptable practices like the use of children or relatives as interpreters in difficult and sensitive interviews about health, housing or legal status. Bars on spouses’ access to learning should be removed, and initiatives like family learning and extended schools should be encouraged to assist in this. Because of their linkage to parents and children, approaches such as family learning and extended schools can also be important in their influence on the next generation.

For some learners, it is easier to address language learning through other approaches than ESOL, including, most obviously, citizenship programmes, but also more general adult education and outreach activities, where learning about the community or pursuing interests and activities can be linked to learning English.

5.4 Tackle underemployment

Underemployment of migrants is a serious issue. Underemployment can arise because of language limitations, because of unfamiliarity with how recruitment works in Britain, or because people feel pressured – by advisers or services like Jobcentre Plus (who have placement targets), or by their own sense of shame at being unemployed – into taking whatever is available. For those whose qualifications are not recognised in Britain, and for those whose skills have been acquired in countries with undeveloped qualification systems, underemployment is a particular issue.

Although a formal system exists to recognise overseas qualifications (through UK NARIC\(^ {101}\)), recognition is, in practice, limited to formal, certified, mainly academic qualifications, and many people are unaware of it. Some countries have very limited

\(^{100}\) This may, for example, explain the high proportion of taxi drivers from ethnic minorities in some cities.

\(^{101}\) National Recognition Information Centre for the United Kingdom.
qualification systems outside the academic field, and establishing equivalences can be difficult. Many people have acquired a high level of skills and knowledge in work – informally or through some form of uncertificated apprenticeship – but have no certificate to prove it.

In 2008, Government launched a new set of work-focused ESOL qualifications, but the new qualifications, which fall within the overall Skills for Life framework, are set at a relatively low level (Entry Level 3 and Level 1). There is a continuing need for ESOL provision for more highly qualified migrants with little English, who could make a much greater economic contribution if given appropriate, relevant ESOL provision102.

Although a number of projects have developed ways of accrediting the learning and skills that migrants arrive with103, there is no national service available which can recognise and give credit for such learning. As a result, many migrants are unable to find work which uses their skills, especially if their English is weak. The resulting underemployment represents a substantial opportunity cost to both the UK and the individual.

Transferring qualifications is rarely a simple matching process, and considerable learning may be required to apply old skills in a new context, as some employers have recognised104. If well managed, supervised work experience can be a very helpful way of topping up skills and knowledge and enabling people to perform at the level of their former qualifications in a UK context105.

As workers become more globally mobile, the issue of recognising qualifications is likely to rise in importance, and international qualification systems, building on the agreements on equivalence in higher education in Europe, need developing further.

5.5 Adopt appropriate teaching methods

Migration raises a number of issues for teachers, and attention is needed in initial teacher training and ongoing professional development programmes to a number of specific issues. These issues include:

- **the pace of teaching and learning**: this depends partly on proficiency in English. Many programmes deal with very heterogeneous student groups, and those with the greatest needs may find the pace of learning difficult, especially when they are also trying to manage other complex issues in their everyday lives;

- **age mix**: much provision is carried out in mixed-age classes. British culture places little value on age as an indicator of status and determiner of respect, and indeed the British sometimes view age negatively. For people from cultures where status and age are closely linked, this can be uncomfortable;

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103 Waddington (2005).
104 For example, the NHS runs conversion programmes for overseas qualified doctors and nurses coming to work in Britain, in addition to applying English language tests.
• **gender mix**: most classes include a mix of men and women, which can be a problem. For people from cultures where segregation of the sexes is expected, mixed-sex provision can be an absolute bar to participation;

• **previous educational experience**: this can vary greatly within the same class, with some migrants arriving with graduate qualifications, and others with little primary education.

• **social mix**: the mixing of people from different social classes can be a significant bar to cohesive learning groups;

• **cultural expectations of learning**: in some cultures, it is expected that teaching will be much more didactic than is common in British education. Interactive methods (including approaches which aim to build cohesion within learning groups) may seem alien and intrusive;

• **self-confidence**: this is a key issue in all adult learning, but is likely to be particularly so for people who have undergone major upheavals in their lives;

• **location**: some kinds of learning are most effectively undertaken in the workplace, but some employers do not welcome workplace learning. Likewise, some learners prefer their employers not to be involved (especially perhaps where they see learning as a way of escaping to more rewarding or appropriate jobs); this may be a particular issue where highly skilled migrants are employed in low-skilled sectors, where promotion opportunities may be limited or non-existent.

5.6 **Attend to the learning needs of established communities**

One cause of tension within communities is the perception that some groups receive unfair advantages. Tension can occur when a generally deprived community has a substantial migrant or minority population. Focusing educational attention on the needs of long-term residents as well as new arrivals is important to ensure visible fairness.
6. Key messages

Migration and diversity are inevitable features of our society; they provide opportunities for individuals and make communities and the economy stronger. However, active intervention by Government and by providers of education and training is needed to maximise the benefits.

better support learning in vulnerable communities

6.1 Lifelong learning for social cohesion: four principles

Lifelong learning should seek to support the principles of social cohesion laid out by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion. This implies adopting four principles:

• welcoming newcomers promptly: people should have access to learning at the earliest possible point, when their motivation to learn and integrate is highest, and before they learn to survive without integrating. One way of enabling people quickly to access learning would be a ‘welcome entitlement’ to a free course for all those new to an area;

• prioritising integration: funding of initiatives and programmes should be directed at activities which bring people together across divides, rather than encouraging ‘separate development’. Integration is a particular priority in communities which already experience high levels of social exclusion;

• encouraging contribution: learning activities should seek to enable everyone to make a visible contribution to the life of the community;

• focusing on the future: educational programmes and community development work should emphasise building futures on the experience of the past, rather than rehearsing past conflicts.

6.2 The role of Government in lifelong learning

• Central Government should seek a more consistent approach to learning for migrants, involving all relevant departments and recognising the interests of all relevant departments in ensuring that those entering the country integrate as rapidly and successfully as possible.

• The strategic role of Local Government in lifelong learning should be strengthened, and Local Government should have a key leadership role in developing learning to support cohesion and integration.

• Government should seek to ensure that a wide range of learning opportunities exist (whether funded by Government or not) to enable people to meet and pursue interests with people from a wide range of backgrounds.
Government should ensure that the Adult Advancement and Careers Service is sensitive to the needs of migrants and has adequate access to specialised resources and to networks in the third sector to meet migrants’ particular needs.

6.3 Policy objectives

In implementing the four principles above, learning programmes for migrants should seek to help individuals build and balance their capacity to contribute economically and socially and to develop themselves.

Providers of learning opportunities should aim to:

- provide safe, accessible neutral territory where people can meet, interact, and build trust and relationships with people of different backgrounds;
- ensure that new arrivals have the opportunity to acquire the skills, particularly language (including vocational language), and cultural knowledge (including learning for citizenship) needed to play a productive part in British society;
- ensure that everyone in deprived communities develops the skills to overcome their disadvantages, through access to good work, and through developing the social capital to build links and a sense of shared purpose;
- prioritise the most vulnerable groups and communities (migrant and settled).

These four aims are naturally and creatively in tension with each other. How they are balanced will vary from time to time and place to place. However, all need to be addressed to some degree.

6.4 Changes to educational provision

Specific measures are needed to:

- improve access to ESOL, particularly the first levels;
- improve work-related ESOL for people preparing for entry to the workplace and those already in work;
- strengthen ESOL for those outside the workforce, especially through outreach strategies to dependants (usually married women) who may have been settled for some years;
- improve recognition of overseas qualifications;
- adopt appropriate teaching methods;
- revive and develop civic education, both for new arrivals and for existing communities, to strengthen social capital and engagement in shared futures.
6.5 Appropriate approaches to funding

Funding approaches should support the principles outlined above. Provision should include:

- a ‘welcome entitlement’ to one free publicly funded course for everyone moving into an area, to demonstrate a welcome and encourage newcomers to see lifelong learning as part of their identity;
- free access to first-stage ESOL, to ensure that people are not barred from taking steps to become members of the community by cost or by their employers;
- funding to enable migrants to participate in learning independently of their employers, and recognising that the ability to pay for learning is constrained not only by low earnings, but also by dependence on husbands for funding and by high levels of responsibility for dependants, within and outside the UK.

6.6 Conclusion

Over time, migration has contributed enormously to the quality of life in Britain and to the prosperity of Britain and the countries from which migrants come; it continues to do so.

Most migrants are keen to contribute to and become part of British society, and see learning as a way to achieve this. Better coordination of lifelong learning, and a more strategic approach to lifelong learning policy could produce real benefits for Britain’s communities and the people within them, both those who have been here for generations and those who have just arrived.
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**Papers presented to the Inquiry Expert Seminar**


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Annex 1: Management of migration

Government is naturally anxious to minimise conflict between migrants and host communities, and is conscious of a popular view that migrants represent a threat to social cohesion and to access to employment and social welfare for the settled community. These anxieties are not the exclusive prerogative of the white British community: they are sometimes shared by members of more established former migrant groups. The fears will be more serious in a period of economic contraction, when the economic driver of demand for labour may appear to be less pressing, and many people will experience stress in their personal and work lives.

In response to these anxieties, Government has introduced a series of changes to regulations and processes to attempt to regulate the inflow of migrants. From November 2008, there are three distinct categories of migrants:

- **European Economic Area (EEA) entrants**: people entering from countries within the EEA\(^\text{106}\), who have the right of free entry and the right to work;
- **Asylum seekers**: people seeking asylum under the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees on the grounds of a ‘well founded fear of persecution’ in their country of origin. These people must make a claim for asylum, which will be processed within six months. Applicants may be recognised, with their dependants, as refugees (currently 19 per cent of applicants), given leave to remain on humanitarian grounds (17 per cent), or refused, in which case they are required to leave the country. While awaiting a decision, asylum seekers are not allowed to work and have no right to ESOL in the first six months. Refugees currently constitute around 5 per cent of all inward migration’
- **Migrants from outside the EEA**: since November 2008, people entering from outside the EEA must apply for entry under a new five-tier points-based scheme, which replaces the previous work permit system (Table 1).

Table 1: The five-tier entry system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Requires a UK sponsor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tier 1</td>
<td>Highly skilled workers (e.g. scientists and entrepreneurs)</td>
<td>Not required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 2</td>
<td>Skilled workers with a job offer (e.g. nurses and teachers)</td>
<td>UK employer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 3</td>
<td>Low-skilled workers filling specific temporary labour shortages (e.g. construction workers)</td>
<td>UK employer – scheme currently suspended, allowing only EU entrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 4</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>UK-based educational institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 5</td>
<td>Youth mobility and temporary workers (e.g. musicians coming to play a concert)</td>
<td>UK employer (not required for youth mobility)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^\text{106}\) The EU countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
Annex 2: Data on migration

It is not possible to present a simple, reliable map of migration, internal or external. Data is patchy and variations in legal status make it difficult to have a precise picture of the extent and nature of migration into and within the UK. This is especially true for those who migrate, permanently or temporarily, within the EU. The politically contentious nature of immigration compounds the data problems, since those being investigated may be reluctant to reply or to give honest replies, while commentators may have political motives for interpreting and presenting data in particular ways. These factors also make it important to be cautious about how issues are described.

The most authoritative source of data is the census, because it is a whole-population survey. However, the coverage of the census is particularly weak on the most transient population groups, and during the ten years between censuses much can change. The 2001 census, for example, tells us nothing about the A8 migration since 2004, nor about the effects of the economic downturn in 2007. Sample surveys like the Labour Force Survey provide more up-to-date data, but again have particular problems with the most mobile populations.

Migrants within the EU are not required to register their entry or exit, so evidence of the numbers entering and leaving derives again from sample surveys, and while the people in the largest groups in recent migration, those from Eastern Europe, are required to register if they want to work, some studies suggest that as many as a third do not do so, and there is evidence that many A8 migrants come repeatedly for relatively short periods. Migration from beyond the EU is controlled, and therefore more thoroughly documented, but the real numbers are uncertain because of the unknown scale of illegal migration. The sampling interviews for some monitoring exercises are too far apart to detect some movement. Ethnic monitoring continues to be problematic because of reluctance to declare ethnicity among some groups.

An alternative way of understanding the picture is through qualitative research, with interviews of individual migrants. However, here the research literature is uneven and has historically concentrated heavily on migrants facing the greatest problems, especially asylum seekers. As a result, the research literature is less informative about the experience of ‘mainstream’ migrants. It has also, until very recently, not examined the impacts of migration at local level.

107 The eight countries which entered the EU in May 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. At the time of accession to the EU, average incomes in the A8 countries were 40 per cent of those in the existing Union. This is what distinguished them from the other two countries, Cyprus and Malta, which joined at the same time.

108 Drinkwater et al. (2007).

109 The Home Office estimates the total illegal migrant population as in the range 300,000–500,000.

110 Cases have been cited of Polish migrants arriving, changing job and location two or three times, and returning to Poland before the standard data systems have picked them up.

111 Craig et al. (2004).
Annex 3: Contributors

This paper builds on a preliminary paper on lifelong learning demography and migration\textsuperscript{112}, produced at the beginning of the Inquiry’s work late in 2007. That paper formed a basis for an invited expert seminar in November 2007 and was widely circulated for comment. The following individuals and agencies submitted evidence or contributed to the seminar. We are very grateful for their help.

- AdEd Knowledge Company LLP
- ALC Migration Task Group
- Alex Goldberg, Community Issues Director, Board of Deputies of British Jews
- Andy Honeyman, Deputy Director, Managed Migration Policy, Border and Immigration Agency
- Audit Commission
- Boston College
- Community Action Research East
- CEBR
- European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training
- Chris Minter, Head of Adult Skills and Learning, Leicester City Council
- Commission for Rural Communities
- Construction Skills
- Debbie Weekes-Bernard, Senior Research & Policy Analyst, The Runnymede Trust
- East Midlands Consortium for Asylum & Refugee Support
- East Midlands Development Agency
- Employment Services for Refugees
- EQUAL
- European Social Fund
- Home Office
- House of Lords
- Ian Loveland, Asset Skills
- Institute for Policy Research
- Inside Track Regeneration
- James Lee, Employment and Training Policy Advisor, British Refugee Council
- Jane Elliott Poxon
- Jenny Phillimore, Lecturer, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies
- Jill Rutter, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy Research (IPPR)
- John Eade, Professor, CRONEM, University of Surrey
- Joseph Rowntree Foundation
- KLARS
- Learndirect

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Local Government Association
Lincolnshire Enterprise
London Metropolitan University
Learning and Skills Council
Migrants – Empowerment – Employment – Training
Museums, Libraries and Archives Council (MLA)
National Refugee Integration Forum
National Institute of Adult Continuing Education
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SEESEL 2012
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Welsh Assembly Government
Wokingham Borough Council